Knowledge base and children's long-term retention by Clark, Sandra Lynn




KNOWLEDGE BASE AND
CHILDREN'S LONG-TERM RETENTION
by
SANDRA LYNN CLARK
B.A., M.A., University of Victoria
A dissertation submitted to the School of Graduate
Studies in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Psychology
Memorial University of Newfoundland
August 1993
st. John's Newfoundland
ii
ABSTRACT
Much (" f the knowleds-e base research has provided
evidence to show that children's memory performance is
facilitated when they have a well integrated and large body
of knowledge, unfortunately, much of this research has
focused on acquisition, but not long-term retention
processes, although both of these processes are important in
everyday cognition. In this dissertation, I investigated if
the facilitory effects of changes in children's knowledge
(specifically, structural changes) on acquisition processes
also occur for long-term retention processes,
The purposr-, of tho first Qxperiment "'35 to determine
the nature of ;;. ...e structure of knowledge for children of
different ages and levels of expertise, This study provided
stimulUS materials to investigate the relationship between
changes in knowledge structure and memory processes in the
second experiment, In the first experiment, 213 children
(ages 6 to 14) with sc ;cer expertise (Experiment lA) and 29
children (ages 7 to 13) with tennis expertise (Experiment
IB) generated a story in their area of expertise, The
results showed that there are age- and expertise-related
changes in the struc.ture of knowledge,
In Experiment II, 93 SUbjects (44 a-year olds, 49 11-
year olds) with either low or high expertise in soccer
memorize."! one of two domain-related stories, then after a 4-
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week retention interval, recalled the story. One story
reflected the kno.... ledge structure of low experts (poor
storytype), the other reflected the knowledge ::>tructure of
high experts (good Gtorytype). The results of th~s study
showed that at acquisition, children had better recall for
the story consistent with their current l"'.vel of kno'Hledge
elaboration. More importantly, at long-term retention,
performance ....as better for children with well elaborated
y.nowledge (i'igh in expertise). compared to children with
less elaborated knowledge (low in expertise).
Taken together, this dissertation research indicated
that first, developmental differences in the structure of
knowledge are not lIlinimized for experts in a particular
domain. Second, this research suggested tha~ the influence
of knowledge on memory perfortlance is different for
acquisition and long-term retention processes. The
influence of knowledge on memory performance was greater for
the initial al'qu:'sition than the lon""-term retention of
information. further, for long-term retention, the effects
of knowledge varied depending on whether performance
decrements (forgetting) or increments (hypermnesia) were
measured. The findings were discussed with respect to the
nature of the relationship between knowledge factors and
both memory acquisition and long-term retention processes.
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CHAPTER I
KNOI~LEDGE BASE AND CHILDREN'S LONG-TERM RETENTION
An important factor in ;Jnderstanding the development of
children's memory is the presence of an elaborated knowledge
base. Substantial evidence exists to show that children's
memory performance is facilitated when they have a well
integrated and large body of knowledge. To date, much of
the research on this topic has focused on the acquisition of
informiltion. This is a curious trend since everyday memory
consists of acquiring information and then retrieving that
information aft-.er some length of time. This disregard of
the long-term retention of information seems particularly
b(,~lild('ring given the evidence that acquisition and
retention processes are influenced by different factors
(e.g., Howe & Brainerd, 1989).
There have been v('ry few investlgi'\tions of the role of
knowledge on the retrieval of information over extended
periods of time. This lack of attention to children's long-
term retention has likely occurred because researchers
failed to find significant age differences ir. retention.
However, thi~ was largely because of methodological and
design flaws in this early research. More recent evidence
suggests that long-term retE'ntion is an important part of
the memorization process, and that acquisition and long-term
retention obey different laws for children (e.g., Brainerd,
Kingma, " Howe, 1985; Howe & Brainerd, 1989; Howe & Hunter,
1986). Discovering the processes responsible for both the
acquisition and long-term retention of memory traces is
necessary to advance memory development researc~ (e.g.,
Howe, Kelland, Bryant-Brown, " Clark, 19",l). Specifically,
it is important to determine if the facilitory effects of
changes in children's knowledge base on memory acquisition
also occur for long-term retention. This information would
be important for curriculum development and classroom
learning, for example.
In this chapter, I present an overview of the knowledge
base and long-term retention literatures. These reviews
include a discussion of the methodological problems inherent
in much of this research, as well as solutions to these
difficulties. Finally, I propose hypotheses regarding the
relationship between knowledge and long-term retention, and
outline the three research studies of this investigation.
The purpose of the first two studies was to determine the
structure of knowledge and to generate stimulus materials
for the third stUdy. The purpose of the third study was to
inv12stigate the effects of differences in the knowledge base
on the development of both memory acquisition and long-te-rm
retention processes. To study the effects of differences in
children's knowledge on memory processes (Experiment II), it
is important to know what knowledge exists and how that
knowledge is structured (Experiments IA and IB). Thus, the
focus of this dissertation was on the relationship between
differences in the structure of knowledge and memory
processes, speci tically long-term retention.
Pi. Knowledge Base Literature
Developmental trends in memory have been attributed to
an increase in the ability to use mnemonic strategies (e.g.,
Bjorklund, 1989; Moely, 1977; Ornstein & Corsale, 1979;
Ornstein & Naus, 1985). Strategies typically refer to
deliberate plans sUbject to conscious avaluation, and
utilized to enhance performance (e.g., Bjorklund, 1989;
Brown, 1975; Howe' O'Sullivan, 1990; Naus " Ornstein, 1983;
Pressley, Forest-Pressley, Elliot-Faust, "Hiller, 1985).
Although older children use strategies more effectively than
younger ch i Idren, this does not account for a 11 the
developmental differences in memory performance. For
example, age differences in memory functioning often remain
after differences in strategic processing have been
minimized (e.g., Chi" Ceci, 1987). Furthermore, there is
evidence that differences in semantic kno\olledge (primarily
knowledge of taxonomic categories) contribute to
developmental differences in memory performance (e.g.
Bjorklund, 1985, 1987, 1989; Chi, 1985). That is,
performance differences W'ere minimized, but were not
entirely eliminated, when stimulus materials were equally
familiar to all children (Bjorklund, 1987). This section
begins with a discussion of definitional i ;sues around the
term kno..... leoge, and is followed by a review of the research
directed toward the influence of knowledge on memory
performance.
Defjnitional Issues
There have been difficulties in operationally defining
knowledge base, 1/hich refers to what children know, with
variouR researchers using different definitions. For
example, Bjorklund (1987) emphasizes the semantic memory
components of the knowledge base and his research has
focused on the development of knowledge of the meaning of,
and relations between, words and concepts. In contrast, chi
(1985) defines knowledge base as declarative knowledge,
which inclUdes semantic knowledge and general-world and
domain-specific knowledge. These differences in definitions
reflect the general agreement today that there are several
types of knowledge included in the knowledge base (e.g., Chi
& Ceci, 1987).
Measurement issues have also plagued this research.
specifically, how should one measure how much knowledge
exists so that one also adequately captur, s the nature of
how that knowledge is structured? Such a measurement is
important because today it is generally assumed that both
the contents and structure of knowledge change with
development (e.g., chi' Ceci, 1987; Ho..& , O'Sullivan,
'.990; Schneider, Korkel, & Weinert, 1990). Content
knowledge refers to ho.. much and what knowledge an
individual has in iI particular domain. Structure refers to
the configuration or arrangement of knowledge, inclUding the
pattern of interrelations among information (e.g., Chi'
Koeske, 1983 i Gobbo & Chi, 1986). Further, performance on
cognitive taSks is related not only to the presence or
absence of knowledge, but also how that knowledge is
structured (Chi & Ceci, 19B7; chi & Koeskc, 1983; Gobbo &
Chi, 1986). Given this, researchers should study the
contents of the knowledge base as well as the changes in the
structure of that knowledge. Although there has been a
difficulty in finding adequate means of lIIeasuring structure,
advances have recently been made in the availability of
sophisticated Illeasurement procedures (e.g., chi' ceci,
1987; Howe & O'Sullivan, 1990).
However, content knowledge determines in part, the
structure of knowledge, which highlights the theoretical
difficulty surrounding this issue. Some investigators
suggest that these two tactors should be uncon(ounded it
possible (e.g., Chi' ceci, 1987, Chi, Hutchinson, & Robin,
1989). Chi and Ccci have argued that having more knowledge
in a domain might imply a more elaborated, integ-rated
structure, and they speculated that changes in structure
most likely represent increases in the amount of existing
kno....ledge and some type of reorganization of the existing
knowledge. Alternatively, it is possible to discuss
structure without discussing content. For example, chi and
Caci (1987) have argued that two children could have the
same amount of knowledge, but the knowledge for one child
could be in a better structure, which may manifest as
differences in cognitive performance bet...eei1. the two
children.
For this dissertation, r chose to focus on domain-
specific knowledge, defined as knOWledge about either the
sport of soccer or tennis. Recognizing the content and
structure issue as a difficulty in the field, r proceeded by
looking at both the interplay and separation of content
knowledge and its structure. Content knowledge was measured
as the specific type of information (e.g., tho topics)
generated when children were asked to tell a $tory in a
particular domain. Structure was investigated by measuring
the quality of the stories generated in terms of the
inClusion of appropriate parts of a story as well as the
connections among these parts. In this dissertation the
term structure is used interchangeably with representation.
To study the relationship between knowledge and cognitive
processing I investigated how memorizing information
(content knowledge) of different structure (e. g., poor
versus good) influences memory processing.
There are a number of techniques that have been used to
uncover the structure of knowledge, such as mul tidimenslonal
scaling, node-link schema, categories, and scripts (e.g.,
Chi & Ceci, 1987; Falmagne & Doignon, 1988), which are used
for different types of knowledge (e.g., conceptual
knowledge, eVEonts). Unfortunately, there are problems with
all these approaches. For example, with multidimensional
scaling there are problems determining the correct metric
and in Markov modelling the knowledge domain is typically
known in advance. Con:;istent with Chi and Ceci's {198?}
claim that the types of measures used depend on the
researchers needs, I chose to use story grammars because the
focus of this research was on the. representation of story
knowledge (as opposed to concepts, for example). In
addition, story representation, while llIore difficult to
quantify, enables researchers to learn more about knowledge
organization (Chi & Ceci, 1987) because it more adquately
captures the complexities of knowledge.
Research Findings
Evidence that changes in knoWledge are responsible for
some of the improvements in memory performance comes from
research involving chi ldren' s understanding of taxonomic
information (e.g., Bjorklund, 1985, 1987; Bjorklund &
Thompson, 1983; Bjorklund, Thompson, & ornstein, 1983;
Duncan & Kellas, 1978; Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Ornstein &
Corsale, 1979; Rabinowitz, 1984; Rosch, 1973; Rosch &
Mervis, 1975) and domain-specific knowledge (e.g., Bjorklund
& Zeman, 1982, 1983; Chi, 1978, 1985; Chi & Koeske, 1983).
More recently, further support has been gained for the
relationship between knowledge and memory performance with
experts and novices in a particular domain (e.g., Gaultney,
Bjorklund, & Schneider, 1992; Rorke1 & Schneider, 1989;
Schneider, Korkel, & Weinert, 1989, 1990). These research
findings are elaborated below.
First, the results of category typicality research have
clearly established that there are differences in the
representativeness of category items. Both children and
adu:'ts are better at deciding if an item is a member of a
particular category when the item is highly typical of that
category than when it is not (e.g., t\vBIN is a highly
typical member of the BIRD category whereas OSTRICH is a
less typical member). Further, children's and adult's
conceptions of category members differ (e.g., Bjorklund,
1985; Bjorklund & 'l'hompson, 1983; Bjorklund et al., 1983;
Clark, 1989; Duncan & Kellas, 1978; Rabinowitz, 1984).
Children first obtain knowledge at the most prototypical or
representative categorical items, and as they get older the
boundaries of their categories expand (e.g., Bjorklund et
aL, 1983; Rabinowitz, 1984; Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Rosch,
1973; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). For example, Clark (1989)
showed that children of different ages do not rate words in
the same way. Employing the three semantic categories of
animals, birds, and parts-of-the-body, she found that there
were age differences in children's ratings of high and low
typical instances of each category. For example, grade two
sUbjects had more words rated as high and low typical that
were unique for that grade, compared to grade six and ten
SUbjects. with increasing grade, there was more overlap of
words rated as high and loW' typical category members.
Age differences in category knOWledge are reflected in
memory performance. First, memory performance was better
overall for children who remember'ed items based on child
ratings of category typicality compared to adult generated
word lists (e.g., Bjorklund, 1985, 1987; Bjorklund &
Thompson, 1983; Bjorklund et a1., 1983i Clark, 1989;
Ornstein & Corsale, 1979). Second, recall was better and
more organized for highly typical compared to less typical
category items for both child-generated and adult-generated
lists. Recall of less typical, but not typical ,,,rds,
better when subjects remembered items based on child-
generated word lists. Because jUdgements of category
typicality first become more consistent with age for typical
items, differences in memory should be greatest with lest'
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typi,cal items. This is because many less typici!'l items for
adults have not yet been jUdged to be category members by
children (e.g., Bjorklund, 1985, 1988; Bjorklund, Bernholtz,
& Schwartz, 1985; Bjorklund & Buchanan, 1989, Clark, 1989).
This research suggests that children's memory performance
was facilitated wh~n tested with materials consistent with
their current level of knowledge base development (e.g .•
current conception of category items).
second, differences in domain-specific kno....ledge playa
role in children's memory performance. For example,
Bjorklund and Zeman (1982, 1983) reported that children's
level of recall and organization improved for classmate
names and was higher than that generally found on a standard
taxonomic list. They asked first-, third-, and fifth-grade
children to recall both a list of categorized words and
names of children currently in their class. On the first
test older children outperformed younger children, a finding
not unexpected because there are age differences in
knowledge of the category words. However, when children
were asked to recall classmates' names, age differences in
knowledge were minimized. '£his occurred ostensibly because
all children, regardless of age, are equally familiar with
their clasf':lr.ates. Chi and KOQske (1983) reported high
levels of memory organization at output of dinosaur names
for a child considered an expert in his knOWledge of
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dinosaurs. Further, chi (1978) discovered that expert chess
players (in this case children) showed better mellory
perforlaance than novice chess players (in this case adults).
Typical developmental trends occurred .... ith a traditional
digit-span task.
Third, and perhaps the most impressive demonstration of
how prior knowledge facilitates memory performance, are
studies contrasting experts and novi-:::es in a particular
domain (e.g., Chi. 1978; Gaultney et al., 1992; Knopf,
Korkel, Schneider, & Weinert, ]988; Korkel & Schneider,
1989; Schneider' Korlcel, 1989; Schneider ct a1., 1989,
1990). Fo':" examplo, Korkel and Schneider (1989) and
Schneider et al. (I9aS) used the expert-novice paradiqm to
investigate the influence of soccer knowledge on memory
perforl:lance for third-, fifth-, and seventh-grade children.
Based on a questionnaire that assessed knowledge of soccer
rules and events, half the subjects at each age level W'are
classified as experts and half as novices. For both studies
(Korkel & schneider, 1989; Schneider et at., 1989), experts
recalled a story about a soccer game better than novices,
regardless of age. These studies provided further evidence
that children's prior knowledge is an important factor in
memory performance.
Last, the explanation for better memory performance
comes from an understanding of how knowledge changes with
22
age or expertise. Chi and Roeske (1983) and Gobbo and chi
(1986) havE' directly studied structural changes in
knowledge. Chi and Roeske used a production task where a
child knowledgable about dinosaurs was asked to list names
of dinosaurs and the properties associated with them. The
sequencing and repetition of information generated during
this task '..las taken as evidence for the structure of
information in semantic memory. For example, two names
generated in succession were assumed to be linked in
semantic memory, and properties mentioned for several
dinosaurs were assumed to provide an indication of the
pattern of interrelatedness in semantic memory (i.e., the
structure). 'l'hey reported that differences between better
and lesser known dinosaur knowledge was due to differences
in structure. Further, Chi and Koeske suggested that memory
performance improved for better known knowledge because it
matched the structure of information in the kno'Wledge base
for the child e)Cpert in this area. Gobbo and Chi (1986)
a:!.so investigated the ~;tructure and use of knowledge in
expert and novice children. In their study, knowledge
structure was assessed by evaluating the frequency of
connecting words (e.g., "because" and "if"), and the
switching of topics evident when children were shown a
picture of a dinosaur and asked to tell everything they know
about that dinosaur. They reported that compared to
11
novices, expert children's knowledge was more structured as
indicated by production protocols that were better connected
and more like cohl:'lrcnt discourse. Further, the experts
could access and use their knowledge better as seen in
making more inferences and semantic comparisons.
As children become more knowledgeable in an area, there
are corresponding increase!; in the cohesiveness or
integratedness of the information. Such knowledge forms
structured, integrated conceptual schemes, which results in
morc meaningful and fami! lar knowledge (a. g., Chi & Koeske,
1983; Gobbo &- Chi, 1986; R;lbinowitz, 1984). In other words,
an elaborated knOWledge base includes more items, that are
represented ""ith more features, ",ith stronger inter- and
intra-item relations, and stories that are more complete
(e.g., Bjorklund, 1987; Chi, 1978, Chi & ceci, 1987).
Elaborated items are thought to be accessed from memory ",ith
less effort, leaving information processing capacity for
other operations, such as strategy use (e.g., Bjorklund,
1987, 1989). Information in a detailed knowlp.dge base can
also facilitate memory performance by enhancing
retr levabili ty of individual items (e. g., Bjorklund, 1987
for a review). Thus, children with more expertise in an
area should be able to use th... ir ",ell represented know.1.edge
in order to enhance memory perf,Jrmance, '.:ompared to children
",ith less expertise (e. g., Gobbo & Chi, 1986).
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To summarize, research supports the idea that knowledge
is an integral aspect of memory development (e.g.,
Bjorklund, 1985; Chi & Ceci, 1987; Ornstein « Naus, 1985;
Schneider et al., 1990). When tested \oiith familiar
materials, children's memory performance is comparable to
adults, "because what is considered familiar to adults may
not be faniliar to children" (e.g., Chi & Koeske, 1983 p.
37). Specifically, typical age differences in memory recall
can be minimized when children memorize information they are
more familiar with or that is better represented in their
knowledge base. This effect has been shown for both
semantic memory concepts, and domain-specific knowledge.
The effects of well integrated knowledge on memory
performance occur presumably because such information is
more easily retrieved. Unfortunately, much of this research
has centred on studying how changes in the knOWledge base
facilitate the initial acquisition of information.
Researchers are just beginning to investigate if the
advantages of memoriZing elaborated knowledge enhance the
long-term retention of information (e.g., Chi & Koeske,
1983; Clark Ii Howe, 1990; Yussen, Stright, Glysch, Bonk, LU,
Ii Al-sabaty, 1991). An essential question then, given the
evidence for the importance of knowledge to the acquisition
of information, is whether knowledge is similarly beneficial
to long-term retention. The long-term retention literature
15
is reviewed next and is followed by a discussion of the
relationShip between these two factors.
B. Long-Term Retention Literature
This section begins with a discussion of definiti.onal
issues, that is followed by a review and critique of the
long-ten~ retention literature. Briefly, greater precision
of definitions has been paralleled by a renewed interest in
studying developmental changes in long-term retention.
Long-term retention is now thought to consist of two
components, performance decrements and increments, which
correspond to forgetting and hypermnesia. The early
forqetting research qenerally indicated no da:velopmental
trends in forgetting. However, these conclusions llIust be
tempered by evidencQ that much of this early work was
cethodologically and procedurally unsound. More recent
research that overcomes these problellls shows that there are
developmental differences in forgetting. The hypermnesia
research was plagued with some of the same methodological
problems inherent in the forgetting area. Unlike the recent
forgetting research, the stUdies of hypermnesia have not so
clearly identified developmental trends, even for more
recent methodologically sound investigations.
pefinition of Terms
Precise definitions of long-term retention have
16
recently been provided in the literature (e.g., Howe &
Brainerd, 1989). Long-term retention performance depends on
the relationship between both performance decrements and
increments over time. It has become apparent that
investigations of developmental trends in long-term
retention must adequately separate factors that depress
performance from factors that enhance performance. This
precision in definitions has allowed investigators to study
more clearly the relationships between initial learning and
later recall and the changes in items recalled over a series
of retention tests. Specifically, long-term retention can
be evaluated by comparing performance at the acquisition
session with performance at the retention session, and/or by
comparing the number of items remembered on the first
retention test with the number remembered on successive test
trials, as occurs in mUltiple trial retention studies.
For this dissertation, long-term retention was defined
as inclUding the global performance measures of forgetting
and hypermnc'\ia, consistent with current usages of the term
(e.g., Brainerd et a1., 1985; Howe et al., 1992).
Forgetting refers to net performance decrements, Which
occurs when fewer items are recalled at retention than at
the end of acquisition, or on later compared to earlier
retention tests. Hypermnesia refers to net performance
increases, which occurs when more items are recalled on
17
later compared to earlier retention tests. Because a
stringent acquisition criterion design (e.g., perfect recall
at the end of the learning session) 'Was used in this
dissertation, the only change in performance that could be
observed bet""een initial learning and later retention was
forgetting. In other words, because recall is at criterion
after acquisition, there is no room for improvement across
the retention interval (see Howe & Brainerd, 1989). An
additional situation where forgetting, and in this case
hypermnesia, can occur is during the retention test itself.
specifically, with mUltiple trial designs, recall levels may
vary across the retention phase.
Early research on childr"~n's forgetting has yielded few
dcvclopIlIental findings of intE-rest (see Howe' Brainerd,
1989, for a review). No age differences in forgetting were
reported for both word lind picture recognition tasks for a
variety of ages and reter.;ion intervals (Fajnsztejn-Pollack,
1973; Hasher &: Thomas, 1973; Kagan, Klein, Haith, &:
Morrison, 1973; Lehman, Mikesell, &: Doherty, 1974; Morrison,
H<lith, &: Kagan, 1980; Nelson, 1971; Rogo!!, Newcombe, &:
Kagan, 1974; sophian &: Perlmutter, 1980; Wagner, 1978;
wicklegren, 1975). For example, Rogof! et al. (197<1)
studied forgetting over a felol minutes, 1 day, or 7 days
using a forced-choice recognition memory for pictures task
,.
with 4, 6, and B year old children. They found that
forgetting increased over the retention interval for all age
groups, but found no developmental differences among the
groups. Fajnsztejn-Pollack (1973) also investigated picture
recognition memory in 5 to 16 year old children across a 2-
to 4S-week retention interval where sUbjects received a
variable number of learning trials. consistent with the
other authors, Fajnsztejn-Pollack found forgetting over the
retention interval for all age groups, but no age
differences in retention. She concluded that the
performance decrements seen over a variety of retention
intervals are independent of age. Similarly, Hasher and
Thomas (1973) reported no Age X Retention interaction for
picture recognition memory after a l-week retention interval
in 3 to 9 year oids. This early research indicated that
with picture recognition tasks and for SUbjects ranging in
age from early childhood to late adolescence, general
performance decrements over the retention interval occurred,
but without an Age X Retention interaction.
A serious concern with this early research is the
exclusive use of recognition versus recall tests. A basic
methodological issue in developmental research is to ensure
that measurement procedures are maximally sensitive to age
changes (e.g., Brainerd, Reyna, Howe, & Kingma, 1990). In
general, recognition tasks are less sensitive measures of
,.
developmental changes in memory than recall tasks. This use
of recognition tests is particularly questionable for
st'Jdying developmental changes in children' 5 memory because
the chances of finding developmental differences in
forgetting are decreased. In developmental research, the
use of a more sensitive measure such as recall is
methodologically more appropriate (e.g., Brainerd et a1.,
1990; Howe & Brainerd, 1989; Ornstein & Corsale, 1979).
In contrast to the absence of developmental differences
in forgetting with recognition tests, counterintuitive
findings were found .... ith recall tests, such as less
forgetting for younger than older children (e.g., Dempster,
1984; Mishima , Inoue, 1966; Stroud & Maul, 1933; Walen,
1970). For exa..ple, Walen (1970) had grade 5 and college
students learn high and medium frequency words to a
criterion of 80\ correct using eithar a free recall or a
backward serial recall procedure. Retention tests occurred
immediately (30-seconds) or after a 7-day delay period.
Walen found no age differences on the immediate test,
however, the children outperformed the college students for
serial recall on the delayed test, SimilarlY, Dempster
(1984) had grade 3 and 10 students learn a list of 21 words
for either I or J stUdy-test cycles. SUbjects received
immediate (2-':Ilinute) and delayed (I-day) written retention
tests, and a visual recognition test fo110·... ing the delayed
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test. Dempster found that delayed retention was better for
subjects receiving J stUdy-test cycles than those receiving
1 cycle, and that there were no age differences in immediate
recall and delayed recognition tests. However, there were
age differences in retp-ntion in a counterintuitive
direction. specifically, younger children showed better
performance than older children on delayed recall.
DiffiCUlty interpreting these studies occurs because of
a serious methodological flaw, namely, a confound between
the degrce of in! tia 1 learning and retention performance
(e.g., Brainerd et al., 1985; He,e, 1987; Howe" Brainerd,
1989; Howe" Hunter, 1986; Underwood, 1964). It is well
known in the developmental forgetting literature that this
problem is of special concern because children of different
ages generally vary in learning ability. In developmental
studies it is impossible to interpret developmental trends
in retention 'When the initial level of learning has not been
equated across different age groups (e.g., Ho'We lie Brainerd,
1989). Any observed differences are open to at least two
interpretations, which are elaborated below.
To illustrate, consider developmental studies in which
older children learn almost anything faster than younger
children. In a typical memory study in which one or at most
a few learning trials are given, more of the list items will
ha ... e been learned for older than younger children. On a
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subsequent retentic... test older children ",ill likely show
better retention than younger children, b:1t this may be
because the forlller have learned 1II0re of the items (Le., one
cannot forget what one has not learned initially). This is
the first interpretation of observed developmental trends in
retention performance when there are discrepanci..ls in
initial levels of learning. That is, any developmental
trends in forgetting may be due to age-related differences
in initial level of learning, and not to true developmental
differences in forgetting (e.g .• Brainerd et a1., 1985; Howe
& Brainerd, 1989; Howe & Hunter, 1986). The second
interpretation is that any observed differences may be due
to age-related differences in retention processes. It is
impossible to detfllrmine the true statu of an Age X RetClntion
interaction whQn initial levels of learning arc not
adequately controlled. In addition, differences in initial
levels of learning will be greater as the number of learning
trials decrease because l~arning curves are negatively
accelerated (e.g., Brainerd et al., 1990; Brainerd" Howe,
1982) .
It is difficult to interpret walen (1970) and
Dempster's (1984) counterintuitive findings because they did
not control learning with a stringent acquisition criterion.
Their results may be attributable to a confound between
levels of learning and age, which can be explained as
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follows. Retention may reflect variations in retrievability
of items at the end of acquisition, rather than declines in
performance (e.g., Brainerd et a1., 1990). Because easier
items are acquired more rapidly than harder items, and older
children learn faster than younger children, they will have
learned more of the list items at the end of acquisition.
At retention, younger children may appear to have better
retention because they can retrieve easier items learned
previously. Older cl">ildren's retention may appear to be
pOt-rer because they have. learned more. and harder items, that
may be more difficult to retrieve (e.g., Brainerd et a1. f
1990). In other words, "the fact that older children reach
more advanced learning stages means that they acquire
information that is intrinsically easier to lose" (Brainerd
et a1., 1990, p. 10). Thus, younger children may appea£" to
have better retention than older children.
Age-related changes in retention performance have been
found in research where the levels-of-Iearning confound has
been overcome. This is accomplished through the use of a
stringent acquisition criterion that requires all children
nave learned material completely at the end of a series of
learning trials (e.g., Brainerd et al., 1985; Howe, 1987;
Howe at a1., 1992). For example, Brainerd et a1. (1985)
reported that with categorized word lists, forgetting rates
declined from grade 2 to 6 to 11 over a I-week retention
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interval. Similarly, Howe (19S7) reported age differences
in forgetting over a 2-week retention interval where older
children shoved less forgetting than younger children for
picture-word pairs. Further evidence for developmental
differences in retention can be found in Brainerd at al.
(1990) who had sUbjects remember either abstract or concrete
nouns or pictures. They found that forgetting rates
declined from grade 2 to 6 over a 2-week retention interval.
similar results have been reported for unrelated and related
word lists (e.g., Howe at a1., 1992) and for stories (e.g.
Howe, 1991). Howe (1991) asked kindergarten and grade 2
children to recall stories after a retention interval of
either 2 days olr 9 days, and found less forqetting for the
older children. In addition, forgetting seems to bll related
to semantic factors. For example, regardless of age,
forgetting decreased for taxonomically related as opposed to
unrelated materials (e.g., Brainerd et al., 19B5i Howe,
1987; Howe et a .... , 1992).
To summarize, the main findings from the early
forgetting research indicated no developmental differences
in forgetting. However, this interpretation may be
misleading because of methodological and procedural flaws of
this early research (e.g., levels-of-learning confounds, use
of recognition measures). More recently, researchers have
addressed these concerns and have reported development
differences in forgetting for a variety of ages and stimulus
materials. Taken together, recent studies provide
convincing evidence that forgetting rates decline ....ith age.
Hypermnesia
Some early research indicated that memory performance
improved with increasing retention intervals (Ballard,
1913). This \<Iork received very little attention initially,
although it did raise several questions because of the \<Iel1
established Ebbinghaus forgetting function. This
"hypermnesia" phenomenon \<las investigated to determine if it
was a reliable finding, and if so, to establish the
conditions under which hypermnesia versus forgetting
occurred (e.g., Payne, 1987).
Ballard (1913) presented children with a variety of
stUdy materials, such as prose passages, and after various
retention intervals, gave several recall te:::;ts without
intervening study trials. He found that sUbjects' recall
performance improved across repeated tests. Items not
recalled on the first of t\<lO retention tests were
successfully recalled on the second retention test, a
phenomena Ballard labelled reminiscence. However, this
improvement in performance was greater for younger as
opposed to older children. Several researcher::. SUbsequently
reported similar developmental findings (e.g., Ammons &
Irion, 1954; Bunch, 1938; cited in Payne, 1987; Huguenin,
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1914; Nicolai, 1922; Williams, 1926; all cited in Plaget ,
rnhelder, 1973, pp. 47-48; McGeoch, 1935). NC!v~rth~le5S,
there were difficulties lJith attempts to replicate this
early research primarily because of inconsistencies in the
definition of reminiscence, methodological i.nconsistencies
across experiments, and confusion about the most appropriate
theoretical explanation of this phenomenon (e.g., Payne,
1987; Wheeler & Roediger, 1992). As a result, interest in
hypermnesia waned considerably and this topic essentially
disappeared from the development.. l literature. There are
several excellent reviews of this early hypermnesia research
(see Howe' Brainerd, 1989; Payne, 1987).
More explicit definitions and better controlled studies
(e.g., levels-of-learning problem) has renewed interest in
the hypermnesia phcnomcnon. Although some researchers have
reported age-related hypermnesia effects in retention
"-rformance (e.g., Brainerd et a1., 1985; Shaw, cited in
Richardson, 1985), the most recent research indicated no
dovelopmental differences in hypermnesia. For example, Howe
et al. (1992) reported no consistent developmental
differences for hypermnesia for subjects ranging trom grade
2 to college level for a variety of list conditions (related
and unrelated pictures and words) and retention intervals (2
days, 16 days, 30 days). In addition, it is not clear under
what conditions hypermnesia occurs. For example, some
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research has shown that hypermnesia is unaffected by
semantic factors (among others) (e.g., Brainerd et a1.,
1985; Howe, 1987; Howe et al., 1992), whereas other research
has shown that hypermnesia varies as a function of semantic
factors (e.g., Brainerd et al., 1990).
To summarize, researchers have recently identified and
corrected methodological problems that may have suppressed
developmental trends in long-term retention (both forgetting
and hypermnesia). This research indicates that there are
developmental trends in forgetting, and that similar to
memory acquisition, forgetting seems to be related to
semantic factors (e.g .• less forgetting for taxonomically
related as opposed to unrelated materialS). Further
investigations of the hypermnesia phenomenon are necessary
because the recent research has not sc' clearly identified
developmental trends or important related factors. Research
efforts should be focused on clarifying the conditions under
which both forgetcing and hypermnesia occur, with an
emphasis on how these processes fit into the current
formulations of the knowledge base framework.
C. Relationship Between Knowledge Base and
and Long-Term Retention
Evidence for a relationship between knOWledge base and
long-term retention is essentially nonexistent. One
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exception is chi and Koeske (1983), 'Who repC'rted enhanced
long-term retention for a child tested with materials
consistent with his current level of domain-specific
knowledge. A child expert, knowledgeable about dinosaurs,
recalled more about better known than lesser known
dinosaurs, both at immediate recall and one year after the
initial study. A number of methodological problems indicate
caution in drawing conclusions based on these findings. For
elCample, only one child was tested, and initial levels of
recall performance were very low and were not equivalent for
better and lesser known dinosaurs. The apparent forgetting
of lesser known dinosaurs (compared to better known
dinosaurs) after one year may have occurred because recall
of these items was low initially (1 .::., many items were not
learned initiully). From these results it is not clear if
the knowledge base facilitates long-term retention or
alternatively, if forgetting is independent of expertise
(e.g., knowledge base).
The problem here is reminiscent of design limitations
in more traditional memory research in which one learning
tria I is typically used, and is then compared with retention
performance after £ome period of time. This is the levels-
of-learning problem introduced previously. Easier
information is learned at a faster rate than harder
information, older children learn faster than younger
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children, and learning curves are negatively accelerated
(e.g., Brainerd et al., 1985; Howe, 1987; Howe & Hunter,
1986). This means that at the end of acquisition, there
will be levels-oE-learning confounds ... ith other variables of
interest.. Perf=..rmance differences may be attributable to
differences in the extent of learning easy and hard items,
or because older children more completely learned a greater
number \If list items, and not due to differences in the
variables hypothesized to account for performance.
From a knowledge base perspective this problem can be
conceptualized as follows. Supposa that sUbjects high in
knowledge (experts) and subjects low in knowledge (novices)
are given a list of words to remember using a traditional
research design of one or a few learning trials followed by
a performance measure. Because expertl't learn e>o:pert-related
information faster than novices (e.g., McCauley, Weil, Iir
Sperber, 1976; Roth, 1983) I at the end of the fhed number
of stUdy trials, more of the list items will have been
learned by the experts. They will likely show better memory
performance than the novices. KnOWledge base theorists
would likely predict that because e>o:perts remembered more on
an acqUisition test, they would forget less on a retention
test. However, differences in initial learning may account
for any predicted differences at retention. It is entirely
possible that experts recall more (or forget less) because
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of differences in initial levels-of-Iearning, and not
because of differences in knowledge base. Further, research
using these traditional designs does not separate forgetting
from hypermnesia. Because of these confounds, the existing
research precludes deter.ining hc.... kno.... ledge (i f at all)
influences long-terlll retention performance.
As before, the methodological solution to this problem
is to have all subjects reach a prespecified criterion of
performance on a given set of stimulus materials. This type
of control should be implemented to minimize initial
differences in original level of learning for groups that
differ in memory ability (such as experts versus novices or
older versus younger children) and for materials that
potentially vary in difficulty (Ho....e, 1987). This
dissertation research and a study by Clark and Ho....e (1990)
are examples of knowledge base studies that overcome the
levels-of-learning problem. We ensured that all subjects
reached a criterion of perfect recall on 2 consecutive
trials at acquisition. This procedure is important to bring
all subjects to similar learning levels because with single
t.rial designs, many of the items are likely to not have been
learned. Given this methodological control, one can then
investigate the uncontaminated effects (i.e., no levels-of-
learning confounds) of the kno.... ledge base on long-term
retention perfl"lrmance. The importance of using multiple
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trial designs has also become evident recently for studying
other aspects of memory development. For example, Bjorklund
(1geS) and Bjorklund and Buchanan (1989) have reported that
strategy use is apparent for both younger and older chi ldren
after several exposures to the stimUlUS materials, whereas
with single-trial designs, even children aged 10-13 years
have been classified as non-strategic. These findings
suggest that conclusions about the development of memory
strategies will vary as a function of the number of learning
trials administered.
with differences in learning controlled for, the Clark
and Howe (1990) stUdy indicated that the relationship
between knowledge and long-term retentlt.n is ....orthy of
attention, and does not simply parallel the acquisition
findings. They tested memory acquisition and long-term
retention performance for expert versus novice children ....hen
kno.... ledge was equated (neutral stories) and not equated
(experts stories). Presentation of the neutral materials
served as a control to determine if experts were inherently
better at remembering. The main question of interest ....as
whether the use of knowledge consistent with a child's level
of conceptual development enhances long-term retention
(reduced forgetting and promoted hypermnesia).
T....enty children who attended a biology summer camp
(experts in biology) and 20 aqe- and sex-matched novices
Jl
(who did not attend the summer camp) learned passages to
criterion performanc"l (matched for difficUlty) in the area
of e)Cpertise (biology) and an area of nonexpertise (a
passage about the solar system). Both passages ....ere within
the grade level of the children. Objective multiple choice
tests were used to measure level of expertise (one on
biology, one on the solar system). Two weeks following
acquisition, long-terlllretention was measured using a 4-
trial free recall test.
Consistent with previous findings, Clark and Howe
(1990) found that expert SUbjects learned the expert passage
faster than novices and faster than the neutral passage.
More important, at long-term retention, experts forgot less
than novices. There were also some curious results evident
in the Expertise X Story interaction. Compared to experts,
novices forgot more from the neutral story. but there was no
expert-novice difference in forgetting for the expert story.
In addition, the results of this study indicated that
overall, errors decreased across trials, suggesting that
hypermnesia occurred. The long-term retention findings
showed that forgetting does vary with expertise, and
although hypermnesia occurred, it was constant across
expertise. The ClarK and Howe study provided evidence that
the contribution of the knOWledge base to long-term
retention deserves attention. For example, the findings
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suggest that the knowledge base, (1) may influence
acquisition and long-term retention in different ways and,
(2) effects may vary as a function of whether forgetting or
hypermnesia is measured.
O. Research Questions
Several major questions need consideration to further
our understanding of the contribution of kno.... ledge and "'ge
to the. development of memory acquisition and long-term
retention processes. Specific questions addressed in this
research are listed here and elaborated below. First, is
knowledge structured the same way for experts regardless of
age? Por elo:ample, do older and younger experts have
similarly elaborated and integrated domain-specific
knowledge? Second, does knowledge influence acquisition and
retention processes similarly? Third, in terms of long-term
retention performance, how do forgetting and hyperlllnesia
processes relate to knowledlJe manipUlations? Fourth, is
acquisi tion and retention performance better when tested
with materials consistent with current level of domain-
specific kno....ledge?
Research Question One
Investigators have assumed that once a child reaches
the status of expert in a given domain, their kno.... ledge
representation is similar to other experts in that area
J3
regardless of age. It is important to investigate this
empirically, however I given the suggestion that
developmental changes in knowledge include changes in
structure. We do not kno.... that once expertise has been
reached knowledge is similarly integrated, elaborated, and
cohesive {e.g .• structured}. regardless of age. In
addition, we do not know if knowledge representation
differences also exist for children .... ith varying levels of
expertise. Given the evidence for age-related differences
in conceptual knOWledge, it is imJ:-ortant to ascertain
whether thcrp. are similar 8ogo- and/or expertise-related
differences in knowledge for an area of expertise (similar
to concept development in semantic memory) .
Further, if differences in knowledge structure do
exist, do they influence memory processes such as the
acquisition and retention of information, as suggested
earlier. Bjorklund et al. (1983) have argued that the use
of adult-defined word lists with children results in a
confound between differences in information processing and
age differences in knowledge. Any time differences in
knOWledge are possible, as may be the case with different
age children with e:l1pertise in an area, researchers should
consider that this may be a confounding factor in stUdying
developmental changes in cognitive processing. The answer
to this first research question is most important as a link
to the research questions pertaining to memory processing -
the main focus of this dissertation. If there are age-
related differences in expert knowledge, similar to semantic
memory research, these differences should be taken into
consideration when determining the most appropriate stimulus
materials to stUdy long-term retention performance in a
developmental study of experts and novices.
The structure of knowledge was investigated by having
children tell stories in their area of expertise. It was
assumed that the quality of the stories told in terms of
structure (inclusion of story parts and connections among
them) is a reflection of knowledge repres:c::"tation. This is
similar to research discussed previously that investigated
the structure of knowledge of dinosaurs (Chi & Koeske, 1983;
Gobbo & Chi, 19B6). Gobbo and Chi measured the use of
connecting words such as "because" and "if" as indications
of structure for a task where children were asked to tell
overything they knew about dinosaurs. In this dissertation,
story grammars were used as a measure of the structure of
domain-specific knowledge. Specifically, a chiJ.d qenerated
a story, it was scored according to a story grammar, and was
then cl~ssified as to its structural quality (e.g., pcor
versus well structured). Inferences about that child's
knowledge representation for the domain under investigation
v:ere then made based on the story grammar rating.
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Story Grammars
story grammars describe the underlying cognitive
structures used to encode, represent, and retrieve story
information (Rumelhart, 1975). This revie\>' of the basic
assumptions underlying the construction of story grammars is
based primarily on Stein and Glenn (1979) and Handler and
Johnson (1977j as ..,el1 as Johnson and Mandler (1980), Whose
wer}. is most often referred to and used in this area. This
literature is reviewed because it is the basis for the story
grammar used in the analysis of children's story productions
in this dissertation research. The two main types of
stories described by story grammars are goal-based and
nongoal-based stories. Although story grammars was the best
Deans of analyzing story structure here, partly because this
is most cOllllllonly used for expertise research with stories
and partly because the majority of stories told were easily
described by this grammar, there are additional measures
(e.g., Labov's high-point analysis) that may be used with a
different type of story (e.g., McCabe & Peterson, 1984).
According to several researchers (e.C]., Mandler &
Johnson, 1977; Stein & Glenn, 1979 ; Stein & Policastro,
1984) a prototypical goal-based story has six major
constituents that refer to the major structural
characteristics of stories. These include a (n), (1)
setting, (2) initiating event, (3) internal response, (4)
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attempt, (5) consequence, and (6) reaction. The setting is
the introduction of the protagonist, and information about
the physical, social, or telllporal cOntext for the story.
The remaining categories together constitute an episode.
The initiating event contains information about some type of
change in the protagonist's environment. Its major function
is to evoke in the protagonist an emotional response and a
desire to achieve some goal. The internal response includes
goal information, change of state information, and also can
include the protagonist's thoughts and plans about how to
attain a goal. The major function is to motivate the
protagonist to carry out an action(s) directed toward a
goal. The attempt is the protagonist's actions to attempt
to obtain the goal, and the consequence is the outcome of
the attempt. The reaction or ending may include the
protagonist's et\otional/cognitive responses to the goal
attainment, long-term consequenc<'!s that occur as a result of
attaining the goal, moral, and/or a summary of What the
protagonist learned from pursuing a partiCUlar goal. In
addition, direct causal and temporal connections must link
the five episode categories.
To be classified as a story all five parts of an
episode do not have to be included. However, according to
stein and Glenn (1979) and Handler and Johm:cr; (1977),
certain features must always be present in text structure
J7
for a meaningful representation of a story_ According to
these researchers a story must contain: (1) setting,
including introduction of un animate character, (2)
initiatit1.g event or internal response containing information
from which the motivations, goals, and emotional response of
the protagonist can be inferred, () overt attempt of the
protagonist or plan outlining the overt attempt, and (4)
consequence reflecting whether the goal has been attained.
The second type af story described by a story grammar
is the nongoal-based story, which does not describe the
overt actions of someone to attain a goal. In nongoal-based
stories the protagonist is engaged in an action, rather than
in an attempt to reach a goaL For example, this type of
story lnay begin with an event that changes the protagonist's
environment (the King was walk.ing in the woods with his
daughters), indicate an emot:.ional response and unplanned
action (they were enjoying themselves so much they forgot
the time), and finish with an ending (they were k.idnapped by
a dragon) (Mandler & Johnson, 1977; stein & Policastro,
1984). Mandler and Johnson (1977) define nongoal-based
stories as stories that al10..", for the unplanned, automatic
actions to form part of the episode. Nongoal-based stories
are similar in structure to goal-based stories. They
include a(n), (1) setting, introduction of the protagonist,
(2) beginning (similar to StElin & Glenn's initiating event),
3.
(3) protagonist's emotional response to the initiating
event, (4) automatic unplanned action resulting from feeling
a particular emotion, and (5) ending (similar to stein &
Glenn' 5 reaction category).
To summarize research question one, an Objective of
this dissertation was to investigate whether age-related
differences in knowledge structure (in this case stories)
disappeared once a child becomes an "expert" in an area. In
addition, the present research directly ac1dressed the
question of whether differences in levels of expertise were
also tied to knowledge structure changes and hQW this
related to age. It is unclear whether younger expert
children would generate stories with fewer story parts,
and/or stories with few or no temporal and causal links.
Alternatively, perhaps expertise in iln area signals more
elaborate knowleJ.ge representation in terms of the
production of a ·.,ore prototypical story. In this case
developmental differences would be minimized. The findings
of this preliminary stUdy were critical for the primary
research of this dissertation - a developmental stUdy of
memory processing in children .... ith different levels of
expertise. The stories generated in this study served as
the source of materials used to stUdy memory processing.
Research Questions Two Three and Four
The remaining questions addressed in this dissertation
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pertained directly to the effects of knowledge on memory
acquisition and long-term retention performance. To
reiterate, these questions were: does the knowledge base
influence acquisition and retention performance similarlY,
how do the long-term retention processes forgetting and
hypermnesia relate to knowledge base manipUlations, and is
acquisition and retention performance better when tested
with materials consistent with current levels of domain-
specific knowledge?
General theories of memory development, specificallY
knowledge base Illodels, rely on the notion that it is easier
to access well encoded, as opposed to less well encoded
information on a memory test (e.g., Bjorklund, 1987; see
also Bjorklund, 1985; Bjorklund & Zeman, 1982; Chi, 1978;
Chi & Rees, 1983; Ornstein, Baker-Ward, & Naus, 1988;
Ornstein & Naus, 1985). Based on knowledge base research,
one may predict that similar to acquisition, elaborated
knowledqe may lead to less forgetting. One could speCUlate
that retrieval should also be more efficient on a long-term
retention test for well integrated information. This leads
to the assumption that knowledge is a factor that
facilitates both memory acquisition and retention processes.
Chechile and Richman (1982) suggested that forgetting
decreases as information in the knowledge base becomes more
extensively integrated. They also reported that well-
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encoded information such as highly meaningful materials
more resistant to forgetting.
These assumptions lead to the implication that what is
good at acquisition is also beneficial for long-term
retention. In ether words, the benefits of knowledge (e.g"
domain-specific expertise) that typically occur for the
initial learning of information, will also occur for
retention. Children more knowledgeable in an area will
remember more information over time than children less
knowledgeable in that area. This outcome would suggest that
memory acquisition and long-term retention processes are
symmetrical with respect to the effects of knowledge on
memory performance. An explanation for this outcome may be
that memory traces, while cohesive, were not as .....ell
integrated (qualitatively) originally for low expert
sUbjects. This would support the argul,lent that knOWledge
does have an effect in preventing the demise of traces over
a long-term retention interval. This would also be
consistent with the implications of the general theories of
memory regarding the effects of knowledge on memory
processing.
An alternative scenario is that the effects of
knowledge at acquisition do not occur at long-term
retention. There may be no differences in rate of
forgetting for children ..... ith different levels of prior
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knowledge. Tr.is type of outcome would suggest that
knowledge may influence acquisition and long-term re:':ention
in different ways, specific<llly, knowledge effects are
canE inad to acquisi ticn processes.
In terms of long-term retent ion processes spocif iea 111',
Howe et a1. (1992) provided data showing that "regardless of
age, forgetting was attenuated by the presence of features
that bind elements of traces together (e.g., related VS.
unrelated items)" (p. 64). Because experts have ....ell
elaborated knowledge (El.xpertisej in an area, that should
allow easier access to information resulting in better.
performance on a long-term retenticn test. However, this
may depend on whether subjects are tested with materials
consistent with their level of expertise or knowledge
representation. As the acquisition rese<lrch showed, it is
important to use age-related materials to provide a
knowledge base assessment independent of age differences in
memory. If it is important to use expertise-consistent
materials to study memory processing, one would also expect
to see an Expertise X Story type interaction at long-term
retention. Children Io'ith different levels of e)'.pertise
should have better retention for stories structured in a
manner consistent with their current level of knowledge
representation. Knowledge manipUlations may also interact
with age at long-term retention, as seen in an Age X
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Storytype interaction. This should indicate that retention
is best for age-related stories. The alternative Qutcome is
that this trend is important only at acquisition.
In addition to forgetting, long-term retention involves
hypermnesia (e.g., Howe & Brainerd, 1989). Previous
research has reported no consistent developmental
differences in hypermnesia, and relative to forgetting, the
effects of hypermllesia are smalL In addition, although
mUltiple trial testing is important to see hypermnesia
effects, it is a procedure only recently utilized (e.g.,
Brainerd at a1., 1985; Howe at a1., 1992). Based on the
findings of previous research, one implication for the
current research is that there are similar amounts of
hypermnesia for high and low expert children regardless of
knowledge base manipulations.
Alternatively, consistent ..... ith knowledge base
explanations, there may be differences in hypermnesia for
the high versus 10..... expert sUbjects. There may be greater
gains for high expert children over the retention trials duE'
to better initial integration of memory traces. Because
memory traces are more highlY integrated for the high 11xpprt
group, they may rp.trieve tt,..se traces more easily on a
retention test. With each retrieval attempt making
connections ..... ith more traces, recall increases over the
retention interval. Hypermnesia occurs for high but n':lt low
expert subjects. Again, this effect may vary with the type
of materials used (e.g., consistent with current level of
domain-specific knowledge base development).
To summarize research questions two through four, the
main objective of this dissertation was to investigate the
effects of di fferences in knowledge on the development of
both memory acquisition and long-term retention processes.
The present research addressed the question of whether
memory acquisition and retention processes are symmetrical
with respect to the effects of knowledge on memory
performance. Further, it is unclear whether forgetting and
hypermnesia will vary in a similar manner as a function of
knowledge. Finally, acquisition and long-term retention
performance may depend on whether subjects are tested with
materials consistent with their level of expertise.
consistent with acquisitivn research and the use of age-
related materials, this research investigated if children
have better retention for stories consistent with their
current lavel of knowledge representation.
E. overview of Experiments I and II
The purpose of the first experiment was to investigate
the structure of knowledge as measured by story production
for children of different ages and levels of expe:rtise,
knowledgeable about the sport of soccer (Experiment IAJ or
tennis (Experiment IS). It has proved important in other
knowledge base research (e.g., semantic concepts) to study
cognitive functioning with materials rated by same-aged
sUbjects. This has not been done in studies investigating
the effects of expert-novice knowledge on memory processing.
It has simply been assumed that experts of all ages have
similarly integrated and elaborated information. Thus,
Experiments IA and IS will determine if this assumption is
accurate, and the stories produced in these exp~riments will
be us("1 in Experiment II to investigate the effects of
domain-specific kno..... ledge on memory processing.
Children of different ages generated stories in their
area of expertise. Expertise was assessed by a
questionnaire based on existing assessment tools used for
d' ':ermining level of expertise (e.g., Cheisi, Spilich, &
Voss, 1979; Recht & Leslie, 1988; Schneider et aL, 1989).
The structure of the stories ....as compared for children of
different ages and varying in expertise leveL It was
assumed that story structure is a reflection of knowledge
representation. Story structure was analyzed with a story
grammar designed for this research that is based on existing
story grammars (e.g., Mandler I< Johnson, 1977; stein I<
Glenn, 1979; Stein & Policastro, 1984). specifically,
stories were analyzed for the types of elements making up
the story (story c,~ ··<;!.gories such as setting) and the types
"
or relations between them (such as causal and temporal). It
the structure of the stories was the sa!lle for different aged
SUbjects, this ....auld suggest that axpert knowledge is
similar regardless of the age of the expert. If the
structure of the stories varied with age, this would provide
evidence that similar to previous research on the knowledge
base (e.g .• Bjorklund, 1987; Bjorklund (, Thompson, 1983;
Bjorklund et a1., 1983; Bjorklund (, Zeman, 1983: Clark,
1989j. age-appropriate materials may be required to
investigate memory processing differences bet....een experts of
different ages. A similar interaction could occur with
level of expertisG (e.g., Expertise X KnOWledge structure).
In other words, observed differences in story structure may
depend not only on age, but also on exp(.,rt:ise.
The purpose of Experiment II was to investigate the
influence of knowledge on acquisition and long-term
retention performance for different aged children with
varying levels of expertise in soccer. The soccer
ql ~stionnaire used in Experiment IA was re-employed here to
assess expertise. Given that there were differences in the
structure of the children'S stories as a function of age and
level of expertise in Experim~nts IA and IB, one can assume
that the nature of knowledge for different aged experts is
not the same. The influence of these differences in expert
knowledge on memory functioning, particularly long-term
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retention, was investigated. Children memorized a story,
w!1ich came from those generated in Experiment lA, that
reflected these differences in expert knowledge.
Stories representative of those generated by children
with different levels of expertise (specifically low and
high levels of expertise) were presented to both younger and
older children with either high or low expertise. This
procedure allowed me to assess the ability of different aged
experts to process information characterized by either more
or less expert children. For semantic memory information,
previous research has shown that with age-appropri.ate
knowledge bases, younger children outperform older children
on tests of memory (e.g., Bjorklund, 1987; Chi, 1978). It
is unclear if this same effect occurs with experts. Age X
Knowledge Base interactions were investigated for both
acquisition and long-term retention performance. To
investigate this, there were four groups of subjects
factorially combined for the factors of Age and Knowledge
Base, reSUlting in the following groups: younger/high
knowledge experts, younger/low knOWledge experts, older/high
knowledge experts, and older/low knowledge experts. This
control allowed me to dissever the contribution of age and
knowledge base factors to memory performance, both
acquisi tion and long-term retention.
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CHAPTER II
EXPERIMENTS IA AND Ia: STORY STRUCTURE AND KNOWLEDGE BASE
The purpose of these two experiments was first, to
provide stimulus materials for Experiment "II, and second, to
determine if the structure of domain-specific kno.... ledge
differs for sUbjects of different ages and with different
levels of expertise. Subjects, knowledgable about soccer
(Exporimcmt 1l\) or tennis (Experiment IB) generated stories
rather than the typically used word lists to obtain a more
comprehensive representation of expert knowledge. It was
assumed that the structure of the stories would provide
information regarding the representation of knOWledge.
Experiment II.
The children were randomly selected to participate
from a pool ot approxima-':ely 300 children registered in the
St. John's Minor Soccer Association League. After receiving
executive committee approval from the st. John's Minor
Soccer Association League the parents were telephoned, given
an overview of the stUdy, and asked if they would agree to
thdr child participating. Those children whose parents
returned a signed parental consent form indicating that
,.
their child could participate were included in the sample.
A total of 240 male children ranging in age from 6 to 14
years participated in Experiment lA. However, some children
did not provide data, and some data were unusable because of
equipment malfunctions. This resulted in 213 SUbjects used
in the rJnal analysis, with the following age breakdowns:
13 6-year-olds 01 = 6.4, §Q = 5.1), 21 7-year-olds 0:1 = 7.5,
.§Q" 3.8),29 a-year-alds <11" a.5, g;); = 3.1),20 9-year-
oids (M = 9.3, .§.Q .. 2.9),31 lO-year-alds (M - 10.4,.s..o:-
).8),27 l1-year-olds (M'" 11.5.• &'! = 3,7),34 l2-year-alds
(M = 12.5, ~ = 3.8),29 13-year-olds (M" 13.4, .sL:! '"' 3.7),
and 9 14-year-olds (M = 14.1,.sQ = 2.0).
~
stimulus materials consisted of a questionnaire adapted
from previous research in this area (Cheisi, spilich, &
Voss, 1979; Recht & Leslie, 1988; Schneider, Korkel, &
Weinert, 1989). A 37 item questionnaire, referred to as the
pretest, was used to assess children's knowledge about
The questions (primarily multiple choice) consisted
of knowledge of the rules of the game, terminology, and the
principles of the game. For example, the questionnaire
included the following types of questions: "Which team has
the kick-off to start the match?", "The technique of heading
means?", and "Who decides if a goal has or has not been
scored?" (Refer to Appendix A for the complete
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questionnaire). Two coaches of the st. John's Soccer
Association, plus several acquaintances who have played
soccer in organized associations for many years, agreed on
the appropriateness of the questions to assess soccer
knowledge. Other materials included a tapereeorder.
Procedure
Subjects \<lere tested individually 1n a quiet room
either in their home or in an office at the university.
Each subject received a booklet of the pretest questions.
The experimenter instructed sUbjects t" read each que£l7.ion
and indicate the correct response. For the younger
subjects, t~le experimenter read along with the children as
they proceeded through the pretest. The. score on this
pretest was converted into a percentage correct that
reflects level of expertise for soccer knowledge. After
completion of the pretest, the SUbjects were asked to tell
the experimenter a story about soccer, Which was tape
recorded and later transcribed. Subjects received no othe.:
prompting. The entire session lasted approximately 40
minutes.
StOry Grammar Scoring
The scoring system used to analyze the prot')cols
generated from the SUbjects (see Table 1) was based on
criteria from Fitzgerald, spiegel, and Webb (1985), Johnson
and Mandler (19~0). Mandler (1987), Handler and Johnson
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Table 1. Definition of the Seven Levels of story
Structure.
Label Def1.n1.t1.on
1 scripts They involve a routine to be followed
rather than a problem to be solved, or
they involve a general event description
consisting of a sequence of acts. They
generally predict and describe what
happens {Nelson, 1986).
2 Descriptive
Sequences
3 Reactive
Sequences
4 Nongoal-based
Stories
5 Abbreviated
Episodes
A series of descriptions of objects or
events and some story categories. They
have no goal-based structure, and
no or few causal connee" -l.ons between
statements (e.g., Fitzgerald, spiegel,
Webb, 1.985; Stein & Glenn, 1977).
A series of descriptions of objects
or events and some story categories.
They have no goal-based structure, but
include some causal connections between
statements (e.g., Fitzgerald et a!.,
1985; stein & Glenn, 1977).
They include some story categories, but
have no indication of goal-based
structure. Episodes include an
initiating event that have significance
for the protagonist, and includes an
emotional response and unplanned action
(e.g., Johnson & Mandler, 1980; Mandler
& Johnson, 1977; stein & Policastro,
1984) .
A goal-based structure is present or
implied. There are some, but not all
story categories present (e.g., setting,
initiating event, ending etc.) (e.g.,
Fitzgerald et a1., 1985; stein & Glenn,
1977) .
6 Goal-based
Stories
7 Goal-based
stories wit.h
mUltiple
episodes
S1
They include a goal-based structure with
all six st.ory categories present {e.g .•
Fit.zgerald et a1.. 1985; Mandler &
Johnson, 1977; stein & Glenn, 1977;
Stein & Policastro, 1984}.
They are the same as goal-based stories
with more than one episode (e.g.,
Fitzgerald et a1., 1985; Stein & Glenn,
1977) .
(1977), Nelson (1986), stein (1979), and Stein and
Policastro (1984). They have outlined means of
investigating the structure of narratives generated by
children. Scoring the pre<::ent protocols based on these
criteria first corroborated the general classifications made
and second permitted a determination of lesser and better
structured stories.
scripts were included as a category because a small
number of children did produce scripts rather than stories.
A script refers to a general event description consisting of
a sequence of acts that involve a routine to be followed
rather than a problem or episode. In addition, scripts
often do not include specific characters, or time or place
information (e.g., Nelson, 1986). Alternatively, a story
includes information about characters, setting, a problem or
focus of the episode, and outcomes (e.g., Stein" Glenn,
1979) .
Consistent with the research reviewed previously,
stories with all parts of an episode and causal and/or
temporal links were scored as well structured. Those
containing permissible deletions of any category of
information were considered as poorly structured. For
example, a poorly structured story, classified as a
Descriptive Sequence, was a story with story categories
missing, and with no causal connections between
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propositions. A well structured story (classified as a
Goal-Based Story) includc;d the 6 story categories, a goal
structure, and causally and temporally connected
propositions. A3 seen in Table 1, stories were scored
according to 7 levels of stary structure. A higher rating
of story structure refers to a better story structure, with
two notable exceptions of scripts and Nongoal-based Stories
because they are qualitatively different from the other
categories. ThUS, an increase from least to best structured
story corresponds to the story lev!:!ls 2, J, 5, 6, and 7.
Two individuals rated the stories, ....ith an interrater
reliability of 92-%, and any differences ....ere resolved
through discussion. (Refer to Appendix B for examples of
each type of story).
In addition, each story was scored for content on a 4
point scale, which refers to the actual propositions that
made up the stories. Recall from the previous diSCussion on
page 5 that content and structure can be differentiated in
that structure refers to the pattern of the information (in
this case the parts and connections of ~ typical story),
whereas content refers to the information (or topics)
contained within the structure. For example, content is
what the story was about, such as a description of a person,
or telling abo-.lt a soccer game. The four types of content
scored were (1) description of object, rerson, or event, (2)
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description plus some soccer game information, (3) primarily
soccer game information plus some description, (4)
game information. Unlike structure, for content a score of
4 is not "better than" a score of 1. The levels of story
structure (eXcluding scripts because by definition they are
only of one content type) were crossed with each of the four
levels of content.
Design and Analys.l§
Overall knowledge of story structure was investigated
with a stepwise multiple regression analysis with the
production scores from 1 to 7 (Story structure) as the
dependent variable, and Age, Expertise, and story Content as
the independent variables. Age and Expertise were both
continuous variables. Age was measured in months and ranged
from 69 to 174 month:: (5.9 to 14.6 years) and Expertise was
measured as the score on the pretest converted into a
percentage and ranged from 24 to 97 percent. Story Content
was measured as a score of 1 to 4. Additional analyses were
done to investigate the mean level of Age and Expertise for
each type of Story structure, and the number of each type of
Story structure generated. A second regression analysis was
performed with Story Content as the predicted variable with
Age, Expertise, and Story Structure as the possible
predictor variables. Finally, a supplementary analysis was
conducted on the number of story categories generated at
each age level.
Rnults and Discussion
Regression with story structure
Table 2 shows the correlations between the variab.les,
the unstandardized regression coefficients (8) and
intercept, the standardized regression coefficients (b),
well as the values of R, R2, and adjusted R2 with story
structure as the dependent variable. R for the final
regression equation was significantly different from zero,
I(2, 210) .. 54.64, 12<.001. Only two of the independent
variables, Expertise and Age, contributed significantly to
the prediction of story structure. Expertise Ct.-value '"
9.84) entered the equation first, Age (!;,-value = 2.97)
entered second. After step 1, with Expertise in the
equation, .B!. = • J 1, p<. 001, and after step 2. \,lith Age added
to the prediction of Storytype, ~ = .34, p<. 001, indicating
that the addition of Age to the equation resulted in a
significant increment in~. There .....ere no significant
interactions, .....hich .....as evaluated by a semi-partial
correlation or incrernent-in-variance test (g.g., Kerlinger &
Pedhazur, 1973; 'fabachnick & Fidell, 1989) that i.ndicated
the variance which is uniquely associated with the
interaction is nonsignificant. Despite thei:c high
interrcorrelation (I: = .79), Age and Expertise each
contributed independently to predicting Story Structure.
Table 2. MUltiple Regression with Age, Expertise, and
Content Variables on Knowledge of story
Structure for Soccer.
Variables
Structure(DV)
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Age
Expertise
Content
r·lultiple R =.59
Rl = ,34
Adjusted R2 = .33
.0171* .27
.0378* .35
.0943
Intercept=-.43
structure
Age
Expertise
Content
Correlations
Structure (DV) Age
1-00 .55
. 5~ 1. 00
.56 .79
.31 .40
Expertise
.55
.7'
1.00
.36
Content
.31
.40
.36
1. 00
Means and standard Deviatlons
Structu[a(DV) Age Expertise Content
Mean
SO
'.2
1.7
125
27.3
67.4
15.8
2.8
.98
J B unstandardlzed regressl.on coefflClents
~~ b - standardized regression coefficients
* P<.Ol
57
Low expert children generated poorly s~ructured stories
and high expert children generated well structured stories,
but they could be either younger or older children.
Although narratives develop, expertise is more highly
related to story structure. These findings suggest that
there are age- and expertise-related differences in
knowledge in terms of story structure. In other words, this
study prOVides evidence that there are differences in the
structure of knowledge for children 0:' different ages and
who have different levels of expertise (e.g.,
expertise, more expertise,.
Mean Age and Expertise for StorY StryctYre
The second analysis lTukey-HSD procedure) was conducted
on the means for Age and Expertise for the 7 levels of Story
Structure. As can be seen in Table 3, with greater age and
expertise well structured stories were generated. In other
words, older children tp.II better structured stories than
younger children, as do children with more expertise
compared to children will less expertis9. f'urther, for Age,
there were significant differences (Q<.05) bet.ween Story
Structures I YS. 7; 2 vs. 5,6,7; 3 VS. 5,6,7; and 4 vs. 7.
for Expertisc, there were significant differences (12<.05)
between Story Structures I Ys. 5,6,7; 2 vs. 5,6,7; 3 vs.
5,6,7; and 4 YS. 7. This analysis showed that there is a
natural division between story Structures for Age (age
Table 3. Average Age and EJ<pertise for Each Type of
story Structure for Soccer.
story Type Age Expertise
M SO
114 55.0 14.4
104 55.7 11.8
112 58.1 16.0
116 62.2 15.5
136 7~ • 4 10.6
13. 75.1 14.5
150 80.3 4.4
Script
Oeser iptive Sequence
Reactive Sequence
tlongoal-based story
Abbreviated Episode
Goal-based Story
Goal-basad Story with multiple episodes
"
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approximately 9 years 0 months = Descriptive/Reactive
Sequences vs. age approxi.ately 11 years ~O months:: Goal-
based Stories). Specifically, younger children were most
likely to generate a poorly structured story such as a
Descriptive or Reactive Sequence, whereas by age 11 or 12
years, children were most likely to generate a better
structured story such as Goal-based Story.
This change in story production between ages 9 and 11
is similar to a developmental shift in the structure of
self-generated stories reported in the literature (e.g.,
Fitzgerald et a1., 1985; Salatas Waters & Hou, 1987). For
example, Sal<ltas Wo1ters and Hau asked third and sixth
graders and college students to gp.nerate passages based on a
sat of prompt words defining the topic. Passages were
assigned a score from 1 to 7 that included distinctions
between the presence of no/fc"ol causal/temporal connections
to more causal/temporal connections and an increasing use of
episodic structure. They found significant di[ftorences in
production scores for third and sixth graders, and no
differences between sixth graders and college students. The
third grade passages included primarily temporal connections
or an inconsistent use of temporal and causal connections,
whereas the sixth grade passages includ(!d more causal
connections.
A similar trend occurred for children with less and
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more soccer expertise. There was a division between Story
structures for Expertise (expertise approximately 57\ ;;;
Descriptive/Reactive Sequences vs. expertise appro>dmately
76\ = Goal-based Stories). Specifically, children with
little expertise (or novices) generated poorly structured
stories compared to those with more expertise (or experts),
who generated better structured stories. Experts, it seems
have a better representation of domain-specific knowledge
than novices.
The findings of the prescnt research provide evidence
that as age or expertise increa les, the structure of
knowledge changes. Based on these results, the assumption
that experts of all ages have similarly integrated and
elaborated information should be questioned. Clearly,
developmental differences in knowledge representation are
not eliminated when expertise is controlled. In other
words, expertise in itself does not signal a standard
structure for the representation of information.
Given that the structure of knowledge varies with age
and expertise, and given the findings of the previous
research regarding Knowledge Base X Age confounds (e.g.,
Bjorklund, 1987; Bjorklund & Thompson, 1983; Bjorklund,
Thompson, & ornstein, 1983; Bjorklund & Zeman, 1983; Clark,
1989), there m~y be processing differences between children
with different levels of expertise on materials that reflect
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differences in knowledge representation. There is evidence
to indicate that memory processing is facilitated when
tested with materials consistent with knowledge base
development (Bjorklund, 1987; Bjorklund & Thompson, 1983;
Bjorklund at aL, 1983; Bjorklund Ii< Zeman, 1983; Clark,
1989). It is not clear if this facilitory effect would
occur for children with both high and 'oJ'" expert knowledge
tested with materials consistent with knowledge
representation (e.g., either poor or well structured
stories) in their domain of expertise. This que~ '...ion was
addressed in Experiment II.
Number of Passages by story Structure
There were very few passages generated as scripts
(6/213) I Nongoal-based Stories (9/213), or Goal-based
Stories with multiple episodes (10/213) (see Table 4 for the
number of stories generated for each story structure).
These data indicated that, consistent with Stein and
Policastro (1984), children were more likely to generate
passages rated as stories rather than scripts. This is in
contrast to Nelson (1986) who claimed that most younger
children produce scripts when asked to generate stories.
Regression with Story content
Thc sccond regrcssion analysis with story Content as
the predicted variable was conducted to investigate the
relationship between story structure and content. This
Table 4. Total Number of Passages Generated for E<lch Type
of story structure for Soccer (Percent<lges are in
Brackets) .
Scripts
Descriptive Sequences
Reactive Sequences
Nongoal-based stories
Abbreviated Episodes
Goal-based Stories
Goal-based Stories
with multiple episodes
Total
45
10
(3%)
(21.%)
(15')
(n)
(23%)
(29%1
(5%)
(100",)
analysis showed that Age was the only tactor that
significantly contributed to the prediction of Story
Content. R for the regression was slqnlficantly different
from zero, I(l, 211) - 40.05, 2<.001 (B - .40, B2 - .16,
adjusted &2 _ .15). The correlation between Age and Content
was ~ ,. .40. This relationship was l"urther probed by
calculating the number of children from e.!lch age level that
generated stories from each of the four types of content
(see Table 5). A Chi-square analysis (R<. OOS) revealed that
ill. similar proporti.on of children of different ages generated
passages from the 4 content categories, with the exception
of the 6- and 7-yoar-o!ds. A similar pro~ortion of children
from ages 8 to 14 mo!Ot frequently generated passages about ill.
soccer game, or a soccer game with some descriptive
information. The 6- and 7-year-olds' passages we;.-e
primarily descriptive in content.
These results are consistent with Fitzqerald et a1.
(1985) who found in their analysis of story content few
developmental trends in changes of content knowledge.
silllilarly, Stein, Glenn, and Jarcho (1982) (cited in
Fitl:gerald et al .• 1985) reported no developmental changllls
in the thematic content of story productions of children in
Kindergarten, Grade 3, and Grade 5. In the present
research, content knowledge per sa did not change with a9'~
between 6 ~nd 14 years, however, ago- and expertise-related
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differences were observed in the way in which the content
was structured. This f indinq is important for
investigations of memory processing of passages to ensure
age Or expertise differences are due to structural and not
content differences in the stories. Because the 8- to 14-
year-aIds' stories were of simililr content, developmental
differences attributable to structural differences in
knowledge can be determined.
Supplementary Analysis
An additional analysis was conducted on the number of
story categories such as setting, initiating event, attempt,
consequence, ending etc. for Age, to examine developmental
patterns in the inclusion of categories in generated
stories. Fitzgerald at a1. (1985) reported age differences
in the number of story categories generated, which they
suggested was one indication of developmental changes in
knowledge of story structure. Following the procedure used
by Fitzgerald et al. (1985), for each age level, the number
of settings, initiating events, attempts, consequences, and
reactions was calculated for those stories classified as an
Abbreviated Episode, Goal-based story, or Goal-based Story
with mUltiple episodes. The present findings showed that
consistent with Fitzgerald et al. (1985), there were age-
related ir;";reases in the number of story categories.
However, this finding must be interpreted with regard to
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story length. In this study, older children told longer
stories, whlch may account for the observed age differences.
If the question of interest is determining precisely ....here
these age differences are located (e.g., is the age trend
because older children include more settings than younger
children, for example), then one would want to look at the
proportion of categories generated for each age level. A
Kruskal-Wallis analysis indicated that there were no
significant age differences in the proportion of categories
generated in each story (12).05). Those findings indicate
that while there were age trends in the number of categories
generated (e.g., Fitzgerald at al., 1985), there were no
systematic age changes in the inclusion of the different
story categories in self-generated stories.
Summary of Experiment 1A Results
The main findings from this study indicated that there
are independent age- and expertise-related changFos in the
structure of domain-specific knowledge. Having expertise in
a domain does not automatically indicate that kno....ledge is
represented similarly regardless of .3ge. In addition, young
children's knowledge representations change with age to
become better structured. 1\ transition occurs at
approximately 11 years of age in that better structured
stories are generated. A similar transition occurs when
expertise levels become relatively high (Le., approximately
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76% based on a questionnaire to assess expertise). Children
\~ith a high level of expertise generated better structured
stories compared to children with lower levels of expertise
(i.e., about 57% based on a questionnaire). These findings
may be interpreted as indicating that a developmentcol- or
expertise-related change in knowledge structure is evident
as children approach adult-like conceptions of knowledge,
and as relatively high levels of expertise are reached. In
addition, this study indicated that after age 8 and up to
late childhood (age 14), ~;elf-generated stories in a domain-
specific area do not differ in content. Given that there
were age- and expertise-related differences in the
structure, but not content of domain-specific knowledge, the
influence of the structure of knowledge, independent of
content, on memory performance in expert versus novice
children wlc'.s investigated in Experiment II.
.,
i:::xperiment IB
This study was identical to the first except sUbjects
were knowledgable about tennis. The purpose of this
study was to replicate the findings of Experiment rA-
for a different area of expertise to ensure that the
findings of the first experiment were not simply
related co a single knOWledge base domain. There are
contradictory reports in the literature as to whether
or not there are qualitative changes in kno.... ledge
representation between younger and older exper':s for
different domains of expertise (e.g., Means&: Voss,
1985; Schneider, Rorkel, & Weinert, 1990). The
objective of this experiment is to determine if the
age- and expertise-related changes in knowledge
representation seen in Experiment IA generalize to
another domain.
Subjects
The childrp-n were randomly selected to participate
from a pool of approximately 100 children registered in
the st. John's Greenbelt Tennis Club Summer Program.
After obtaining Tennis Club approval, the children were
given a written overview of the stUdy and a parental
consent form for their parents. 'I"he sample consisted
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of children who returned a signed parental consent form
indicating permission to participate. A total of 40
male and female -::hildren ranging in age from 7 to 13
years participated in Experiment I6. However, some
children did not provide data, and some data were
unusable because of equipment malIunctions. This
resulted in 29 sUbjects used i . the analysis, with the
follo~ling age breakdowns: ] 7-year-olds (male, M :: 7.6,
ml '" 6.0) I 2 9-year-olds (1 male, 1 female, t! '" 9.4, .§.Q
.. 4.2), 7 lO-year-olds (3 male, 4 female, 11 '" 10.4, .s.Q
'" 3.8),7 ll-year-olds (5 male, 2 female, tl '" 1.1..7, ~
= 2.6) I 8 12-year-olds (3 male, 5 female, M'" 12.2, ~
= 2.6), and 2 lJ-year-olds (female, M = 13.1, ~ =
2.1).
~
Similar to Experiment IA, a 35 item questionnaire
was used to asse';s children'~ knowledge about tennis
(see Appendix C). The multiple choice questionnaire
was adapted from sample examination questions from the
Official Instructor's Manual for Tennis. In addition,
the Soccer questionnaire served as a guide to e!1sure f!.
similar number of questions on both questionn,ures
concerned rules of the game, important tennis events,
terminology, and principles of the game. Two tenniG
instructors (pros) at the T~nnis Club ph:s :;~veral
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acquaintances who have played tennis in organized
associations for llIany years agreed on the
appropriateness of the questions to assess tennis
knowledge. Other materials included a tapereeorder.
~QY.I:.g
The procedure was identical with that described
earlier, with the exception that the sUbjects were
tested individually in a quite place at the Tennis
Club. They were asked to tell a story about tennis
rather than soccer, that was scored using the scoring
system <1esigned for use in Experiment lA.
Design and Analysjs
Overall knOWledge of Story Structure was
investigated with a stepwise mUltiple regression
analysis with Story Structure (prOduction scores from 2
to 6) as the dependent variable, and Age, Ey.pertise,
and Story Content as the independent variables. Only
story categories 2 to 6 wore included as no children
gene::-ated stories rated as Scrif'ts (rating 1) or Goal-
based Stories with mUltiple episodes (rating 7).
Similar to Experiment lA, Age and Expertise wen~ both
continuous variable:.. Age in months ranged from 83 to
159 (6.11 to 13.3 years), and Exportise ranged from 29
to 83 percent. Story Content was again measured as a
score of 1 to 4. Additional analyses conducted were
the same as thos;! reported in Experiment lA.
Results and Discussion
Regression with Story Stru~
Table 6 displays the results of the regression
analysis. R for the final regression l:!quation was
significantly different from zero, I(t, 27) = 20.40,
Q<.OOL Age was the only variable that contr ibuted
significantly to the regression of story Structure,
'",ith a .t value of 4.52, and K = .43. The variable
Expertise approached signif icance Ct.-value"" 2.01,
{2=. 052).
r~ean Age and txpertj S9 for story Structure
An additional analysis (Tukey-HSD procedure)
conducted on the mean differences for Age and Expertise
for each type of Story structure. For the Story
strut;:tures 2 through 6, the mean ages were 101 months
(8.5 years), 114 months (9.6 years), 145 months (12.1
years), 139 months (11.7 years), and 140 months (11.8
years), respectively. The mean expertise levels in
percent (standard deviations in brackets) for the Story
Structures 2 through 6 wero 37 (0), 48.2 (13.7),59
(0), 6].8 (9.8), and 6].1 (9.0), respectively. For
Age, there were significant differences (J2.<.05) between
story Structures 2 VS. 5,6; and ] vs. 5,6. For
Expertise. there were significant differences (I;!<.05)
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Table 6. MUltiple Regression with Age, Expertise, and
Content Variables on Knowledge of story
Structure for Tennis
Van.ables
Structure (DVj
Age
Expertise
Content
11ultiple R = .66
R2 = .43
Adjusted R2 = .41
.0470"'* .66
.3508
.2376
Intercept=-1.69
Structure
Ag"
Expertise
Content
correlations
Structure (OV) Age
1.00 .66
.66 1.00
.62 .60
.42 .32
ExpcrtiDc
.62
.60
1. 00
.28
content
.42
.32
.28
] .00
Means and star ''lrd DeViatIons
Stl-'Jcture (DV) t\.ge Expertise Content
Mean
SO
4.7
1.4
132
18.9
58.2
12.8
2.2
.89
b B unstandardlzed regreSSion coeffIcients
De b - standardized regression coefficients
w* P<.OOl
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between Story structures 2 VS. 5,6.
consistent wit-h Experime.1t lA, this analysis
showed that there is a natur"l division between Story
Structures for Age (age approxirn.:tely 9.0 years =
Oeser iptive/Reacti ve Sequences vs. a:;'" approxLnately
11.8 years = Goal-based stories). There h: also a
division between Story structures for low expertise
(43\) and high expertise (6Jl) for Descriptive/Reactive
Sequences VS. Goal-based stories, respectively.
Number of Passages by Story Structure
similar to Experiment lA, there were no passages
generated as Scripts or Goal-based Stories with
multiple episodes, and very few passages ger-.erated as
Nongoal-based Stories (1/29). See Tar.i..e 7 for the
number of passages generated from /;lach category.
Regression with story Content
A second stepwise regre!;sion analysis with Story
Content as the predicted variable was conducted to
investigate the relatiollship between story structure
and content. This analrsis showed that storytype
marginally contributed :0 the prediction of story
Content (I(l, 27) = 5.94, 12=.02, 8 2 = .18, adjusted 82
"" .15).
Supplementary Analysis
An additional analysis was conducted on the number
74
Table 7. Total Number of Passages Generated for Each Type
of Story structure for Tennis (Percentages are in
Brackets) .
scripts
Oeser iptive Sequences
Reacti ve Sequences
Nongoal-based stories
Abbreviated Episodes
Goal-based Stories
Goal-based Stories
with multiple episodes
Total
(o!t)
(n)
(21\)
(3!t)
(31\)
11 (38t)
(0%)
29 (100\)
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of story categories such as setting, initiating event,
ilttempt, consequence, ending etc. for Age. Similar to
Experi_eot lA, the proportion of settings, initiating
events, attelDpts, consequences, and reactions was
calculated for those stories classified as an
Abbreviated Episode, Goal-based Story. or Goal-based
Story wi th multiple episodes. Because of the small
number of sUbjects in some age groups, only the
proportions were calculated. Consistent with
Experiment lA, a Kruskal-Wililis analysis indicated that
there were no significant age differences in the
proportions of categories generated in each story
(e>. 05).
Summary of Experiment 18 Results
Overall, the findings of this experiment indicated
that there are age-related differencc:s in the structure
of tennis knowledge, similar to the previous findings
with soccer knowledqe. The expertise-related
differences in story structure approached significance.
In a second area ot expertise. the trend is tor
children with less expertise to generate poorly
structured stories compared to children with more
expertise. Specifically. younger children and those
with less expertise primarily generate stories with
some story categories but with no clear goal structure.
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.\lternatively, older children and those "1ith more
expertise primarily generate Goal-based Stories with
all necessary story categories and a clear goal
structure. Again, these findings for age are
consistent with previous research (e.g., Fitzgerald at
111., 1985; Olson & Gee, 1988; stein, 1979; stein &
Policastro, 1984).
The main conclusion from Experiments IA and 18 is
that deve.l,Jpmental differences in the structure of
knowledge are not minimized for experts in a particular
domain. It seems apparent that lc~·el of expertise must
also be considered if one is interested in studying the
relationship between knowledge and cognitive
functioning such as memory processing. There may be
memory processing differences between children with
different expertis~ levels on materials that reflect
differences in kno....ledge representation. similar to
previous research indicating that knowledge base
differences may be confounded with age (e.g.,
Bjorklunr:, 1987; Bjorklund et a1., 1983), knOWledge
base differences may also be confounded with expertise
level. The relationship between knowledge
representations and memory processing was addressed in
Experiment II.
CHAPTER III
EXPERIMENT I I : KNOWLEDGE BASE AND MEMORY
The purpose ot this experiment was to investigate the
influence of knowledge on acquisition and long-term
retention performance in younger and older children who have
more or less experti.sQ in soccer. Based on the findings of
l:<periments rio. and 1B it is clear however, that differences
e:<ist in the structure of knowledge for younger versus older
arj particularly low expert versus high expert children. In
t:u, present experiment, the influence of these differenCp.5
in knowledge representation of experts (e.g., more or less
integrated and elaborated) on memory fu.,ctioning was
investigated. Developmental studies of memory processing
have not considered the possibility of differences in the
structure of knowledge for experts of different ages that
may influence memory processing. More specifically, the
purpose of this experiinent was to begin to dissever the
contribution of age and knowledge base factors to long-term
retention. I was especially interested in findings that
'bring out' the respective contributions ot age and
knowledge base factors to forgetting and hypermllesia. The
approach used was to measure retention performance for
chi ldren who varied in level of exper~ise, but who wt!re the
same age. Similarly, the effects of age on retention
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performance, were measured with children who differed in
age, but who were at the same level of expertise.
SUbjects
The age groups used in this experiment correspond to
the divisions for Story Structure observed in Experiments IA
and IB, and elsewhere (e.g., Fitzgerald et a1., 1985;
Salatas Waters & Hou, 1987), namely, younger children
(approximately 9 years) and older children (approximately 11
years). Younger children's stories were primarily
Descriptive and/or Reactive Sequences, whereas older
children's stories were primarily Coal-based Stories. In
addition, previous research with expert children have used
similar age divisions (e.g., Rorkel & Schneider, 1989; Means
&- voss, 1985; Schneider, Korkel, & Weinert, 1989).
Specifically, the SUbjects in this study were male soccer
players registered in the St. John's Minor Soccer
Association League. There were 44 younger children (1:1 =: 8.8
years, .!iQ '" 9.8, Range 6.10 to 9.11 years) and 49 older
children (11 .. 11.5 years, .§Q = 6.6, Range 10.0 to 12.7
years). All children were volunteers and were obtained via
'w'ritten parental consent.
Stimulus materials consisted of the same 37-item
questionnaire used in Experiment IA that assessed children's
79
current knowledge about soccer (refer to Experiment IA for
det.tils of the questionnaire). In addition, SUbjects
rr.emorized soccer stories. There ",ere two types of stories -
poorly structured and ....ell structured stories. Both stories
were constructed by first choosing stories froll those
generated in Experiment lA, one froID each of the story
structure categories 2 and 6 was selected (to represent a
poor and well structured stCl"Y, raspectively). The stories
were modified so they hart a similar word count. The poorly
structured story ....as 179 words in length, Ule well
structured story WAS 192 words in length. The stories were
designed to be equally famililr to all children by cnsurinq
they were consistent with information likely to arise in
this sport. Also, proper names (team and person names)
changed so they differed frolll narnes used. by the soccer
league. Each story consisted at 18 propositions. The
stories are presented in Appendix D.
Subjects were tested individually in a quiet room in
their hoce. Each subject initially answered the pretest
questions on soccer in the same manner as Experiment lA.
The score on thi!: questionnaire wo!~ converted into a
percentage co.':rect, and reflects le'/e1 of expertise for
soccer knowledge. For this experiment subjects were
assigned to either a High Expertise or a Low Expertise group
based on their score on the soccer questionnaire. SUbjects
who scored above 65% were classified as children with high
expertise in soccer, subjects with scores less than 65% were
classified as children with low expertise in soccer. 'l'he
mean expertise level was 76% for the high expe.t group, and
50% for the low expert group. These means are similar to
the mean differences found in Experiment IA between poor and
well structured stories for Expertise (expertise 57% =
Descriptive/Reactive Sequences vs. exper;,;ise 76% "" Goal-
based stories). In addition, the classification of low
expert children used here is similar to the classifications
used for research using the novice-expe.... t paradigm (e. g. ,
Schneider et al., 1989). However, the current criterion for
high expertise is more strict than those used previously.
After completion of the pretest, subjects participated
in two memory sessions, an acquisition session and a long-
term retention session, spaced 1\ weeks apart. During
acquisition, each SUbject memorized one of the. storie.s under
free recall procedures. To control for developmental
differences in reading ability, the experimenter read the
story aloud thE: first time, and SUbsequently as required.
After the story was read once completely, children performed
30 seconds of buffer activity, Which consisted of engaging
the child in conversation unrelated to soccer. The child
was then given a free recall trial ~Jhere he was asked to
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recall as much of the story as possible in any order. The
experimenter told the child that it was sufficient to recall
the gist of the story rather than remembering it ....ord-for-
word. Recall continued until the complete story had been
recalled or until 20 seconds had elapsed without a respon~e.
At this time the experimenter asked if there was anything
else he could remember. These study-buffer-recall cycles
continued until SUbjects recalled all 18 propositions from
the story on two consecutive trials. This seSsion lasted
approximately 50 to 60 minutes.
Although subjects recalle<j via gist, their stories were
scored on the 18 proposition;;: of the stori~s (e.g., Howe,
1991). Children's propositi·:lnal recOIll was scored using
procedures identical with those typically found in the
lit~ratur~ (e.g., Howe, 1991; Johnson" Mandler, 1980;
Mandler" John!>on, 1977; Stein" Glenn, 1979).
Specifically, children's respon~es were scored for the
number of propositions corre::tly recalled. A response wa5
considered correct if the SUbject recalled the main idea of
the proposition using either originally presented wording vr
semantically sind lar ~lOrdinCJ.
Four weeks later t!ach ;::hild participated in a long-term
retention 3"'!iS~on. Childrl;":o I>:ere instructed to remember
everything they c:ou:r.d froln the story prescnt~d "me month
previously. The children were given a saquence of four
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recall-b..fier cycles for the previously memorized story
without further study trials. In other \~ords, children were
not shown the story again, but were asked to recall
everything they could from the story they learned
previously. This was followed by 30 seconds of buffer
activity which involved engaging the child in conversation
unrelated to soccer. This procedure continued until four
recall trials had been administered. The children'f>
responses were scored th~ same as described above for the
acquisition session. This session lasted approximately 15
to 20 minutes.
~and Discussion
The design of this experiment was a 2 (Age = younger
versus older children) X 2 (Expertise = low versus high
expertise) X 2 (Storytype '" poor versus well structured) X
10 (Trials: acquisition) OR 4 (Trials: long-term retention)
factorial where the first three factors were between
SUbjects and trials was ·".ithin sUbjects. The acquisition
analysis was based on the maximal trial of the last error
for the child whc took the longest to reach criterion, which
was 10 tri.als. The results are reported first for the
acquisition session and second for the long-te~m retention
session. For acquisition, an analysis of variance (ANOVA)
on the errors (propositions not recalled) in recall was
performed. The purpose of using ANOVA in this experiment
S3
was to ensure consistency with existing knowledge base
research and because this was preliminary research. For
retention, an analysis of covariance (J!.IlCQVA) on the errors
in recall was performed. The rea !jon for using an ANCQVA Gn
the long-term retention data was as ell. additional control
for levels-oE-learning differences at acquisitjon (e.g.,
Howe, Ccurage, & Bryant-Brown, in press) _ The criterior.
design at acquisition was important to bring SUbjects close
to similar learning levels (because with single trial
designs, many items are likely to be unlearned). However,
there may still be differences in learning at the end of
acquisition. 1\ c.:ovariate was used (total error!;. at
acquisition) to statistically control these effects at 10ng-
term retentio:J.
Acguisi tion
For acquisition performance, the ANQVA produced
significant main effects for Age, r{~, 850) .. 58.)7, ,2< OO~;
Expertise, I(l, 8s0} ... 41.42, 12.<.001; and Trials, ,[(9, 850)
= 84.70, _,:,,001. Not surprisingly, younger subjecb; had
more errors overall than older su:Jjects (!:! = ).10, 1:1 = 1.41,
respectively), low expert subjects produced !llor,~. errors (11 =
2.94) than high expert sUbjH'.ts U! ... 1.40), and errors
decreased over trials to criterion.
More importantly, there were several significant I.-way
interactions. First, as seen in Figure 1, an Expertise X
I - Poor storytype
Mean Errors
9 ,
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o
low expertise High expertise
~. Mean Errors at Acquisition for High and Low
Experts as a Funct ion of storytype.
B5
Storytype interaction emerged, E(l, SSO) - 22.32, Q<,OOl,
indicating that, as predicted, low experts had more errors
with the good storytype than '.,:.he poor storytype, and high
experts had more errors with the poor storytype than the
good storytype. Newman-Keuis tests confirmed that these
differences -in memory for storytypes were significant
diffe ....ences for low expert CI2:<.Ol) and high expert (e<.Ol)
children. Consistent with other knowledge base research,
these findings suggest that memory performance is better
when children are tested with rnnterials consistent with
their current level of knowledge.
Second, as seen in Figure 2, the Age X Expertise
interaction (:E(l, 850) '" 9.90, 12=.002) showed that for both
ages, low experts had more errors than high experts, but
younger SUbjects had more errors, regardless of expertise.
Younger low experts had the most errors, older high experts
the least, and the younger high experts were comparable in
errors to the older low experts (g>.05). For younger
children, the difference between low and high experts was
significant (g<.Ol). In addition, further Newman-Keuls
tests revealed that for the low exp~rt group, there was a
significant difference between younger l:Ind older children
(12<.01), but for the hiqh expert group, these age
differences disappear {12>.Olj. These findings provided
evidence that expertise and age facilitate memory
II - Younger children
Mean Errors
Low expertise
o Order children
High expertise
~. Mean Errnrs at AcquiGition for High and Lo....
Experts as a Function of Aqe.
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pe.:formance at acquisition. Although acquisition
performance is facilitated .... ith more elaborated kno..... ledge
for both ages, younger children appear to benefit more from
having elaborated knowledge. In other words, a more complex
explanation is required to account for t~e relationship
between prior knowledge and memory performance. Age
differences in knowledge are minimized only for children
~igh in expertise. This indicates that greater attention
should be given to differences in expertise levels,
especially for younger children when stUdying memory
acquisition processes.
There were 2 additional ~ignificant Z-way interactions
with Age. The Age X Trials interaction (E{9, B~O) = 4.70,
};!<.OOl) rev~aled that older children learned the stories at
a faster rate than the younger sUbjects, an expected finding
(e.g., Howe &: Brainerd, 1989). The interaction between Age
am~ Storytype CE(l, 850) = 10.05, 2-.002) indicated that
there wer~ significant differences between the younger and
older childrr.n for both the poor storytype (g<. 01), and a
smaller difference for the good storytype (12<.01) (see
Figure J).
Finally, there was an Expertise X storytype X Trials
interaction, .[(9, 850) - 3.55, 12<.001. Figure 4 shows that
children low in expertise learned the poorly structured
story faster than the well structured story, and children
_ Poor slorytype !..:::._:~:] Good slorytype
Mean Errors
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Younger children Older children
Figure 3. Mean Errors at t\cquisition for Younger and
Older Children as a Function of Storytype.
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~. Mean Errors at Acquisition tor High and Lo..,
Experts as Function of storytype for Trials.
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high in expert.ise learned the well structured story faster
than the poorly structured story. This suggests that
stories that ilre consistent with knOWledge base are learned
with fewer errors overall, and more quickly. This provides
support for the suggestion that when investigating rnem;,ry
functioning in expert children, researchers should use
materials that are consistent with expertise level.
The 3-way interaction qualifies the 2-way interactions
in that they are modifiEd by where in the acquisition curve
one looks. That is, there were age and expertise
differences early, but not later in acquisition. This is at
cours!':', the hazard of using traditional single-trial
designs. This points out the importance of using multiple
trial designs (criterion designs preferably) as a procedural
control to ensure materials are equally learnp.d by all
SUbjects. In addition, further support for mUltiple trial
studies come from the finding that these interaction effects
disappear if the acquisition data is analyzed collapsed
across tria Is.
Retention
For the long-term retention analysis, the covariate was
nonsignif icant. The retention analysis showed that, similar
to acquisition performance, there were main effects for Age,
f(l, 339) = 9.23, 12<.01; Expertise, I(l, 339) "" 7.62, 12<·01;
and Trials, I(3, 339) - 6.94, 12<.001. These findings
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revealed that younger sUbjects forgot more than older
subjects (1:1"'" 10.1, M = 8.64, respectively), ct. .... ldren with
low expertise forgot more than those. with high expertise (M
= 9.94, M = 8.63, respectively), and errors c'.ecreased across
trials fM = 10.7, 9.6, 8.7, 8.2 for Trials 1. to 4,
respectively). This provides evidence that there are age-
and expertise-related trends in long-term retention. Unlike
much of the early forgetting research, these results show
that forgetting is not constant across age. In addition,
the findings that errors decreased across trials suggests
that hypermnesia occuX:="!d. However, there were no
interactions with Trials, indicating that hypermnesia
remains constant across age and expertise.
The present findings are consistent ""'ith recent 10ng-
term retention studies that provided evidence that
forgetting does vary developmenta ..1y (e.g., Brainerd et al.
19S5; Howe, 19S7, 1991; Howe et al., 1992), and for
expertise (e.g., Clark & Howe, 1990). Consistent with the
most recent hypermnesia findings (e.g., Howe e.t al., 1992),
this study shoWs that hypermnesia is less important than
forgetting in accounting for developmental changes in lcng-
term retention performance.
There were no significant higher order interactions in
this analysis. The critical Expertise X storytype
interaction, evident at acquisition, did not emerge at 10ng-
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term retention. This indicates that bet.ter retention is not
dependent on recalling information consistent \<lith current
level of knoWledge base development. Altt,ough memory
acquisition is better when tested when matr..:-ials consistent
with current level of knowledge (e.g., low experts perform
better with poor storytype, high experts perform better with
good storytyp('), memory retention simply depends on one's
level of expertise (high versus low).
The results af the retention analysis indicated that at
a global level long-term retention does vary with age and
expertise level. Specifically, forgetting was minimized
with mora knOWledge, .:l.nd for older versus younger children.
Although hypermnesia was evident, there were no
developmental or expertise differences in hypermnesia. In
addition, no ~~ecific effects emerged with the type of
materials memorized in facilitating tho retention of
information over eo 4-week int.ervaL Alternatively, the
knOWledge base does facilitate the acquisition of
information for experts, particularly when tested with
materials consistent with the representation of knowledge in
the knowledge base.
To summarize, the findings of Experiment II suggest
that knoWledge does not influence acquisition and retention
processes similarly. It appears that the influence of
knOWledge on memory performance is greater for the initial
acquisition of information than the long-ter... retention of
ir,forJ~ation. In terms of long-term retention processes
speci fically, the knowledge base effects vary as a function
of whether forgetting or hypermnesia is measured"
specifi<:':ally, forgetting, b"..t not hypermnesia, varies across
age and expertise. Finally, acquisition, but not retention
performance is better 'When tested 'With materials consistent
with current level of domain-specific knowledge.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS AND GEliERAL DISCUSSIOfl
A. Research Objectives
The first purpose of this dissertation was to examine
the structure or knowledge in children with varying levels
of expertise in a specific domain. The second and more
promi ncnt purpose was to examine the influence of knowledge
on childr.en's long-term retention performance. The firzt
objective ~1<l5 achieved through Experiments 1/1. and 16 where
chi Idren ....ere asked to generate a story in the domain of
either soccer or tennis. E>::periment III also provided
stimulus materials for Experiment II. which was an
investigation of the relationship between changes in
knowledge structure and memory processes. In this study,
children with either high or low soccer expertise memorized
one of two domain-related stories, then recalled the story
after a 4-week retention interval.
It is already w~ll estilblished that there are robust
effects of knowledge on the initial acquisition of
information. Few researchers have addressed the development
of long-t",rm retention itself, let alone directly studying
~lhethE':C the knowledge base has lasting effects on th,,-
retention of information over long periods of time. As
discussed previously, there i:; now evidence that early
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reports of few developmental changes in retention were
likely misleading because of levels-ai-learning confounds
and inconsistencies in definitions. In addition, the few
studies of the relationship between knowledge base and 100g-
term retention have produced different results. for
example, Chi alld Koeske (1983) reported that domain-specific
J:ncwledge did enhance long-te.m retention for a child
kno.... ledgable about dinosaurs. Clark and Howe (1990)
reported that knowledge did influence long-term retention,
but differently than at acquisition. Forgetting was less
for experts compared to nO"~ces, whereas reminiscence did
not vary with exp(·rtise. A second objective of this
research was to examine the influence of knowledge base
factors (i.e., structure cf domain-specific information) to
memory performance, particularly long-term retention. The
19vel~-of-lcarningconfound was eliminated by ensuring all
SUbjects reached a strict learning criterion at acquisition.
The findings of Experiment II are discussed first, foll0\1ed
by Experiments IA and IB because the memory study 'Was the
main focus of this dissertation research.
B. Major Findings and Discussion
Knowledge Base and Memory
The main findings of this research indicated that the
effects of know) edge on memory performance were prevalent at
acqu j ~i ti on and long-term retention, a I though the effects
"Jere stronger ilt acquisitio,'. The globill findi.ngs for the
acquisition phase of Experiment II confirmed ti,,: hypothesis
th<lt the kno',.rledge base is an ir.,portant factor in
tae iii tating memory per Formance I although th is depended upon
the relationship between age and expertise. Age differences
in knoWledge were minimized only for children high in
expertise. For children low in cxperbse, older children
outperformed younger children. In fact, a score of
approximately 70'1;: on a measure of expert':':1e (e.g.,
questionnaire) was required for age differences t.O be
minimized. ~~he use of a higher criter~on of expert.ise
(i.e., 70% on some external measure) may be necessary to
ensure SUbjects have a simiiilrly elaborated knowledge base,
so age confounds with level of e>:per.::ise are minimizcd.
The finding that acquisition performance was better
whon children were tester! with matcrial~ consistent with
knowledge base development is similar to pr.evious knowledgc
base research for a variety of stimulus materials and a';}es
(e.g., Bjorklund, 1987; Bjod:lund & Thompson, 1')8);
Bjorklund et '11., 1983; Bjorklund & Zemiln, 1983; Chi, H73i
Chi & Koeske, 1983; Clark. & Ilowe. 1990; Knopf et al., 1938;
Korkel & Schneider, 19b;; KUhara-Kojima & Hatano, 1991;
Schneider & Korkel, 1989; Schneider et aI., 1989, 1990). In
the present research, children with diffcrent levels of
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expertise learned a passage with fewer errors when it was
consistent with their level of kno...,ledge base elaboration
(low experts had fewer errors wi th the poorly structured
story, high experts had fewer errors with the well
structured story). Bjorklund et al. (1983) have argued that
using adult-defined word lists results in a confound between
differences in information processing and age differences in
knowledge base. Similarly, the present results suggested
that if expertise-related differences in knowledge
representation arc not considered, a confound may result
between differe..,cQs in information processing and expertise
differences in knowll1dgc representation. For example, if
using high expert Illatedals with low expert SUbjects,
information pror.essinq differences Ilay be due t~ k.nowledge
base differences. If knowledge-base consistent aaterials
are used, information processing differences between experts
'oIould more likely be a reflection of true differences, and
not due to differences in knololledge base.
More important, the findings of the long-term retention
session showed t.hat there were deve!opment:al- and expertise-
related trends in long-term retention. Here, both age and
expertise played an important role in preventing the demise
of memory traces over time. older children and children
high in expertise showed less forgetting than younger
children and those low in expertise. Hi3vinq tightly
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integrated knowledge at acquisition helped to decrease
forgetting but not incre:tse hypermnesia. Hypermnesia
effects generally have been found to be smaller than
forgetting effects and not vary as a function of age (e.g. I
Clark & Howe, 1'390; Howe et a1. I 1992). This study also
produced few developmental findings for hypermnesia.
childr('n's recall did improve as a function of test trials,
but this did not vary as a function of age or expertise.
Taken together, the recent long-term retention literature
indicates that developmental trends in retention performance
are best explained by age changes in forgetting, but not
hypermnesia performance (e.g., Brainerd et a!., 1990).
Further, the important Expertise X Storytype
interaction did not emerge at long-term retention,
indicating that retention was not facilitated when tested
with materials consistent with level of e>:pertise (i.e., low
experts showing better retention with the poorly structured
story, high experts showing better retention with the well
structured story). Children learned the story consistent
~Iith their level of knowledge elaboration fastest at
acquisition, but no differences emerged at retention.
Similar findings have been reported by Yussen et al. (1991)
who stUdied memory learning and forgetting with adults for
stories of good versus poor form. They found that after a
24-hour and I-week retention interval, good story form
99
facilitated learning the stories, but did not influence
retention. In the present study, knowledge base consistent
materials resulted in large and robust advantage::> in
meCloJ'izir,g stories, but for retention of stories over a 4-
wec;:y. interval, expertise ...as the primary mediator in
facilitating retention.
With appropriate methodological controls in place
(e.g., levels-oE-learning controls), the differences
observed in retention for children with more and less
knowledge in an area suggested that the knOWledge base does
influence retention, but in different ....ays than acquisition.
This is consistent with recent evidence that indicates 10ng-
term retention contributes to developmental differences in
memory performance and is influenced in different ways by
factors associated with acquisition. This has been reported
for a variety of ages, stimulus materials and retention
intfJrvals (e.g., Brainerd et al., 1985; Brainerd et al.,
1990; Clark & Howe, 1990; Howe, 1987, 1991; Howe et a1. ,
1992). For example, the findings of this research
corroborate the Clark and Howe (1990) study, where fewer
differences were found in forgetting than acquisition
between expert and novice children.
To summarize, this research was aimed at investigating
the independent contributions of ege and knOWledge base
factors to both memory acquisition and long-term retention
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performance. The findings indicated that at acquisition,
there was an interaction between age and expertise, but at
long-terll retention, it appeared that age and expertise
independently contributed to performance because of the
absence of this interaction. However, for both acquisition
and long-term retontion. differoncQs were not entirely
eliminated after partial ling out expertise or age. Overall,
evidence is mounting that knOWledge intluences acquisition
ilnd retention processes differently (o.g .• Brainerd at al.,
1985; Clark," [iowe, 1990; Howe, 1987). few investigators
have looked at asymmetries between acquisition and long-term
retention processes. However, this r"scarch indicated that
long-terlll retention is an important part of explicating a
comprehensive cnderstanding of memory develop.ent, but
difters in notable ways frolll acquisition processes.
specifically, according to the findings of this research,
enhanced memory performance due to knowledge showed large
effects at acquisition compared to reteneion. The prel::lent
results also suggested that with a 4-week retention
interval, only the forgetting aspect of global retention
performance and not hypermnesia, varied as a function of
expertise.
How should one explain these long-term retention
findings? There is evidence from constructive aspects of
memory that what one already knows will influence how one
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encodes and remembers an event (e.g., Bartlett, 1932; in
Bjorklund, 1987; Paris, 1978; Piaqet "Inhelder, 1973).
Also, DeMarie-Orablow 11991) has suggested that having the
knowledge may only be a first step in improving mellory, as
seen here by less forgetting for high versus low experts.
Some other factor may be necessary for this knowledge to be
accessed and used. She has suggested that several factors,
one of which is the structure of knowledge, likely
contributc! to enhanced memory performance, in .!Iddition to
having more knowledge per sa (DeMarie-Drohlow, 1991).
Perhaps low experts "restructure" the good structured story
so it is more !;illilar to their knowledge base
representation, resulting in no differences in retention for
the two types of stories. Children with high expertise may
engage in a similar process (e.g., filling in missing story
parts), so again retention of the two storytypes is
equivalent. In other words, each group of children could
use their existing knowledge representation to process both
the stories efficiently. Overall, having more knowledge in
an area facilitated retention, but this should be considered
with respect to the structure of existing knowledge.
Specifically, to-be-lellrned information JIlay be restructured
to reflect the current knowledge representation to make it
as memorable as knowledge-representation consistent
information.
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Story Structure and Knowledge Base
The findings of Experiments IA and 1B provided a
great~r understanding of how knowledge differs for age and
exper1;ise. The analysis of the structure of domain-specific
knowledge suggested that differences in structure are one
imp.Jrtant source of knowledge development. This study
revealed that experts or different ages, and with varying
levels of expertise do not have sinlilarly structured
knowledge. There were '1ge- and expertise-related increases
in the elaboration of knowledge, as reflected in producing
more prototypical stories. 'I'hus, expertise in itself was
not sufficient to minimize diffet(>nces in knowledge
structure across age. These results are consistent with
Gobbo and Chi (1986) who found that expert knolo'ledge is more
structured (e. g., integrated and cohesive) than novice
~~nowledge. They reported that conpared to novices, expert's
production protocols were more connected syntactically. In
other words, the experts protocols included more "because"
and "if" connectors, and took the form of a more coherent
discourse.
These findings are also consistent with the results of
research studies that directly addressed the development of
story structure in children's story productions (e. g. ,
Fitzgerald et al., ~985; Olson & Gee, 1988; Salatas Waters &
lIou, 1987; stein, 1984; Stein & Glenn, 1979; stein &
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Policastro, 1984). For example, both Fitzgerald et al.
(1985) and Salatas waters and Hall (1987) used a production
task and scoring system similar to the present research that
differentiated passages with no or few causal/temporal
connections from tho~e with temporal/causal connections and
the inclusion of story categories (episodic structure).
These researchers found that the passages younger children
(approximately 8 ye<1rs of age) generated were significantly
different from thosp. generated by older children
(approximately 11 years of age), specifically, younger
children generated descriptive/reactive passages
characterized by no clear goal, and an inconsistent use of
temporal/causal connections. Older children generated
passages .... ith a clear goal, characterized by more causal
connections and the inclusion of some story categories. It
is clear from this literature that children's knowledge of
what constitutes a better str.uctured or morc prototypical
story increases .... ith age. Thus, there were differences in
the complexity of story structure with increasing age.
However, the present research indicates that for domair.-
related kno....ledge, expertise is more highly related to story
structure than age.
C. Contributions to Existing Research
This dissertation research is related to the general
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concerns of "':lowledge base and children's memory development
in several notable ways. One issue is to unequivocally
establish the existence of developmental trends in long-term
retention performance, and to determine if this is different
from the processes occurring at acquisition. The importance
of long-term retention comes from everyday cognition and
studies of children's testimony and classroom learning
(e.g., Brainerd et a1., 1990; Howe & Brainerd, 1989), \<Ihere
successful retrieval of information after a retention
interval is demanded. Another issue is determining the
pracise relationship between knowledge and developmental
changes in memory performance. Recently, this has revolved
around stUdying the content and structure of knowledge. For
e>:ample, the e>:isting kno.... ledge of experts enables them to
process domain-related information more efficiently,
presumably because as expertise is attained, kno.... ledge is
updated and restructured (e. g., Chi I Hutchinson, &: Robin,
1989). Further, changes in the content and structure of
kno.... ledge are thought to be related to changes in strategy
use and are often considered an important source of these
changes (e.g., Howe &: O'SUllivan, 1990; Schneider et al.,
1990). To provide a comprehensive understanding of the
relationship between developmental change!:> in knowledge and
strategy use, as well as other types of cognitive processing
such as comprehension and inferencing, rese/lrch efforts need
lOS
to focus on several factors. These include measuring how
knowledge is structured, how it changes with age and
expertise, and how different types of knowledge interact
(e.:]., Chi & ce..:i, 1987; Howe & O'SUllivan, 1990; Schneider
etal., 1990).
This dissertation research adds to these general issues
first, in providing further support to establish the
importance of long-term retention to memory development,
separate from acquisition performance. In addition to the
observp.d developmental trends in retention,differences in
the amount and structure of knowledge (e.g., expertise)
reduced forgetting over a 4-week retention interval.
Recovery of information (hypermnesia) on a SUbsequent
occasion was also observed, but was found to be
developmentally consta ...t. Second, evidence was obtained to
indicate that differences in the ... tructure of knowledge
occurred when more knOWledge is attained in an area (e /.,
children become experts). However, age-dependent
differences in the structure of domain-specific :<nowledge
remained even for children classified as experts. Finally,
the importance of knowledge to memory acquisition was
corroborated by this research, and memory development
research in general was extended by the findings that
knowledge is important to long-term retention. but in
different ways than acquisition.
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D. Summary
There are two main conclusions from this dissertation
research. first, knowledge is important to the initial
acquisition and long-term retention of domain-related
information, but in different ways. Memory acquisition is
facilitated by an elaborated knowledge base, but this
depends on the relationship between age and expertise.
Long-term retention is also related to knowledge, but this
relationship iF: l~~s robust than at acquisition, and depends
on which aspect of retention is measured. Expertise- and
age-related trends occur in forgetting, whereas hypermnesia
does not vary as a function of expertise or age. Thus,
knO\<Jledge influences acquisition and retention processes
differently. At acquisition, age and expertise factors
interact in a complex manner, but at long-term retention,
age and eXt-Jertise factors independently contr ibute to
performance. Second, age-related differences in the
structure of knowledge do,) not disappear once a child is
classified as an "expert" in a particular domain. A child's
level of expertise is an important factor in determining the
nature of the structure of knowledge. Further research into
knowledge structure differences among children with
expertise is ....arranted, to extend and generalize these
findings to other domains. In terms of advancing our
understanding of memory development, investigators should,
107
1) ensure multiple-tr':al designs are used at acquisition for
investigating long-term retention processes, and 2)
determine more precisely the relationship between knowledge
and long-term retention including the configuration of
forgetting and reniniscence processes. A beginning in this
matter has been achieved through this dissertation. Future
research should focus on additional domains of knowledge,
and different retention intervals to determine the
generalizability of these memory findings. Research aimed
at what happens to memory traces over time would also prove
helpful in learning more about the different effects of
knowledge at acquisition and long-tenn retention.
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APPEUDIX A: Soccer Pretest
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1. The purpose of the game of soccer is to:
a) take the ball from the other team
b) run with the ball to the goal %eeper
c) score goals and keep the other team from scoring
dl play the game until both halves are over
2. How many shifts are there in soccer? tlow long?
How long is each half in soccer?
3. How many plilyCl"S from each team play each game?
Which player is m';)st likely to score goals?
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a) goa 1 keeper
c) forward
b) defender
dl runner
5. What does it mean to Si.ly a player "cleared the
ball"?
a) he made a long pass
b) it went over a player's head
c) he pilssed to a teammate
dl he kicked it out of bounds
G. When a player mak,~s a cross, this means?
al he runs to the other side of the field
b) he passes the ball to the other side or to the
centre of the field
c) he runs in front of the opponent
d) he kicks the ball to the end of the field
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7. A thro....-in occurs when?
a) the ball has passed over the touchline
b) the ball has paGsed over the defending teams' goal
line
cJ the ball is thrown into the goal
d) a team thro'w's-in the towel
8. Which team has the kick-eff to ~;';art the match?
a) the team that won the coin toss
b) the home team (that is. the team on whose pitch
the match is boinlj played)
c) the away team
d) the team that the referee piCkS
9. What is dribbling?
a) use of the feet to move the ball along the
ground
b) bouncing the ball down the field
c) passing the ball back and forth with teammates
d) a deceptive move to fool an opponent
10. Which players are not part of the soccer team?
a) forwards and wingers
b) defenders and winger;;
c) runners and headers
d) midfielders and defenders
11. Some soccer players are called amateurs. This
means?
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a) they play soccer for fun
b) they play centre field
c) they are defeated by farm teams
d) they are paid to play soccer
12. l'ihen a player has trapped the ball, what has he done?
a) scored " goal
b) stopped the ball under his body
cj stopped the ball and brought it under control?
d) deflected the ball
13. When a team has a shut-out game, this means?
a) neither team scored any goals
b) one team had no goals scored against them
cJ their were no penalties called
d) ~~th a and c
14. Players Who are not currently on the field are said
to be?
15. Hhen is a penalty kick awarded?
a) when a player grumbles
b) when the goal-keeper leaves the goal area
oj when an opposing player receives a bad foul in
the penalty area
d) when a player commits a foul for the second time
16. The technique of "heading" means?
a) a player is moving to....ards the goal line
b) the ba 11 is above the players head
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c) hitting the ball with the head
d) moving the ball down the field
17. If the goalkeeper saves the ball, he has?
a) deflected and/or caught the ball
bl taken the ball home for the next game
c} taken the ball from the opponent
d) prevented the ball from going out of bounds
18. What/where is the centre circle?
19. What does the linesman do?
a) makes sure the playing field has lines
b) coaches the team during play
c) enforces the rules of the game
d) indicates when the ball is out of bounds
20. What is the primary manoeuvre/technique in soccer?
a) passing
c) shooting
b) kicking
d) tackling
21. Which. of the following would a goal-keeper not be
responsible for?
a) catching and punting
bl passing and dribbling
c) throwing and rolling
d) catching and rolling
22. Who is the person that enforces the rules of the game?
a) referee b) linesman c) g"lalkeeper
d\ captain
23. What options does a player have after receiving and
bringing the ball under control?
a) passing and shooting
bJ passing and dribbling
c) shooting
ell passing, shooting, and dribbling
24. Feinting refers to?
a) lofting a pass
bJ deceiving an opponent by a certain move
cJ guarding an opponent
el) obstructing an opponent
25. What is the touchline7
a) side boundaries of the field
b) end boundaries of the field
c) all boundaries of the field
d) the line in the middle of the f leld
26. What are the types of defensive strategies?
a) zone defense
bJ man-for-man defense
cJ zone and man-for-man defense
d) none of the above
After a goal has been scored, where on the playing
fi.eld does the play start again?
a) at the corner flag
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b) at the touchline
c) at the penalty spot
d} at the kick-off spot on the halfway line
28. What is II "striker"? (forward)
a) the player who runs into the soccer pitch first
at the start of the game
b) a soccer fan who goes to all his teams' games
c:} a player who is put on the ! iald when the team
goes on the offensive
d} a player who may take a free kick
29. Whore does a soccer match start?
a) in the centro circle
b) on the touchline
c} at the six yard line
cl) in the penalty area
Which of the following terms do not apply to
soccer?
a) penalty kick
b) goal area
c) touchline
ell the 18 yard area
31. Who decides if a goal has or has not boen scored?
a) the linesman
b) the referee
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the coach is
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c) the goal keeper
d) the captain of the team
32. When does a goal shot in by a forward not count?
a) when the forward was offside
b) when the forward has already scored once in the
match
c) when the forward stays in the goal area
d) when the goalie ""as outside the penalty
J:}. WhaT '!oes the soccer expression "to taKe someone' s
legs out from under him" mean?
a) to contact a players' legs with your own legs .... n
such a way that he falh down
b) to grab a player'S legs with your hands so that
he falls down
c) it's a funny expression that
taking a player off the field
d) it's an expression for a gymnastic drill, in which
one phyer grasps another player's legs.
34. What does "setting up the ball for a player" mean
in soccer?
a) a goal-keeper sends the balJ. to a defender
b) a forward sends the ball to a teammate so he has a
chance of seor ing a goal
c) placing the ball on the field at the start of the
game
d) passing the ball to an opponent
35. When does the referee whistle to call an "offside"?
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a) when an opponent is not at least 9 yards from the
ball at a free kick
b) when all players are in one half of the soccer
field
c) when a player who is alone in front of the
opponents' goal receives a pass
d) when a goal-keeper runs into the other half of
the playing field
36. What happens ....hen a player is offside?
a) there is a time-out
b) the referee shows a player the yellow card
c} the refecee awards an indirect free kick in the
penalty area
d) the linesman raises the flag
37. Which statement about ltoffside" is correct?
a) only one forward can be offside
b) a goal-keeper can never be offside
c) a forward can be offside only if he is in the
opponent's half of the field
d) the linesman blows a whi!';tle when a player is
offside
APPEllDIX B: Example Soccer stories Scored for
Structure
Note: Ni!5l'lles have been replaced with initials.
Note: --- indicates untranscribable words.
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1) scripts:
i) When you qet a goal then you go in. Then the
player kicks a ball to someone else. Then the
player runs with it. Then somebody else takes it.
Then they run with it. Then they pass to it
somebody else. Then somebody else passes to
somebody else then the other team gets a goal.
Then if equal the referee blows the whistle. Then
you get a goal and you're on again. Then I would
play half game when he says go and then get a
score. Then they get a scerp-. Then the other
team gets a score and sometimes it's a tic.
il) The idea of playing soccer is trying to keep the
ball from going inside the crease of the goalies
net and to try and score on the other team. Try
not to foul anybody. It's an interesting sport.
It's like hockey but not as rough. You don't
let --- if you see the ball coming towards you and
there is no players, kick the ball away from you
as fast as you can. When you get the ball you can
either pass it, or shoot it, or you can just kick
it out of bounds if it's too close to the net and
too many people are coming after you trying to get
it. Try not let them get any goals. Every time
13'
before a game you warm up by taking shots, but you
have to hustle for the ba 11 and as soon as you get
the ball just shoot it as hard as you can <3t the
net.
iii) In a soccer game there is two teams, two teams
with eleven players on each team which play ai: the
same time. In a game, the object in the. game is
to score as many goals as you can against the
opposite team in a certain amount of time. There
are two halvell in a soccer game. And there is a
goalie, there's a defense, there's a midfielder,
there's a forward on each team. There is forwards
that can cheer on people, there are penalty shots
that are awarded when somebody has hazed the ball
inside the 18, has been knocked over by an
opposite player. A penalty shot is taken when
somebody is taken down or has hazed the ball
inside the 18. The indirect means you can not
score unless you can make it passed where somebody
can touch the ball, then you snoot. Direct means
you shoot from the net and you score. At ha If you
change around sides.
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2) Descriptive Sequences:
i) One day I was going against the squirrels, they
are one team, I'm on the Donkeys. And I have a
green t-shirt and tney have a brown and white. My
last kick went right across the field and I almost
scored a goal. And our first game against the
Hares I did some blocks, I did the leg block, knee
block, st.omach block, and the head block. And I
went in when we were against the, what are they
called again, when we were against the Bobcats.
We won 9 to nothing and in another game against
the Wildcats we .....on 2 to 1. I got a stomachache
and when I got horne my ear was bleeding from a fly
bi te, and my nose hurt.
ii) Someone tried to kick the ball and he fell on his
back. He scored J goals and the. other team scored
G. And when I was in goal, they shot 11 goals. I
mean they shot 11 shots at me. They scored none
and the defense was hardly doing anything and they
scored 2. And that's was it 2 from the 11.
iii) One time When I was in soccer I got hit right in
the head. It hurt and it's fun. I went across
the field and then he just scored a goal by
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kicking it right to the other side. And the goal
keeper didn't even see it and it the ball went in.
And it was nice, it was good. I like soccer.
hate it when the ball hits me on the head.
3) Reactive Sequences:
i) I like soccer because I get to meet new friends
from different places. lind I like playing soccer.
And it doesn't matter who wins or loses because
the point is just for fun. It doesn't matter ;vho
wins or loses and it's just a fun game. You
know, you can't always win. You can never take
the ball away from the goal keeper or else you'll
have your hands. I 1 ike soccer and my other
friends that I knoW' around here like soccer. My
friend J .• he just lives around the block. He'S
a really good player and so am I and a lot of
other players are good too, And other people.
sometimes don't pass it to me but some.times When I
get the ball I try to get a goaL And once I
tried to do that and I got one and after that we
got a new game. That was the second last game ....e
had. I was t':le first one to get the goal on that
game. Soccer is fun and my other friends like
soccer too. My friend James he's really good at
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it because he was playing soccer for 2 years.
This is my second, well my first year, playing
If we win two more games we might get the
medal.
ii) There was about J minutes left and our goalkeeper
D. kicked it down the field and the ball went too
far ahead of me. It hit off my toe and it went
out of bounds. Then after that they scored a goal
and they tied the game 4-4.
iii) One day me and my friend were playing soccer.
Then our friend M. came along and he wanted to
join in too. So we played a little bit of soccer
and then we wanted to get a drink. So we got a
drink. Then after that we went to a soccer game
because there was a soccer game that day. I never
scored any goals but my friend M. scored a lot
and also my friend B., he scored about 5 goals.
And every single game so far we scored a goal.
Last ye':,r \<Ie won fourth place and today \<Ie're
hoping to win fourth place.
4) Nongoal-based Stories:
i) Like I was riding on my bike and J fell off and
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cut my knee. And ....hen I went to the soccer fie Id
it hurt and I couldn't bend my knee, and then I
couldn't run and I couldn't play. P. came over
and tripped me up and I banged by knee on the
grass. And then I all kinds of stuff in my knee
and I COUldn't run.
ii) There was this farmer with too many calves. lie
had to kill it and make it and he probably sold it
to this big company. And they made it into a
soccer ball. And then, the players started
kicking it around. And I think the cow was still
alive or something. I think the spirit was still
in the ball and he didn't like it. He scared them
all. And then they --- the ball and they played
with it, they still played with it.
iii) The soccer game. Usually 1 play defense, so I was
up for defense. So I always keep on going down.
And the ball passed me down the fence, so the
c-':lch tells me to go back up. So I was right mad
at him. And the ball goes right past me. And I
was so mad, so I kicked the ball into the net ---
the goal and it hit someone in the face.
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5) Abbreviated Episodes:
i) Once I haa a corner kick and my friend kicked it
to me and he qot the ball and he passed it to me
and then I dribbled it up and then I shot. And
then I nearly scored. And then my friend passed
it back and then I scored. And the goalie did a
drop kick and it went down to the other side of
the field. And it nearli got in, but the goalie
just kicked it back to the other end of the field.
My friend D. c'.ribbled it up just a little. bit
more and passed it to me. And I passed it back and
then he scored.
ii) Last week we played a soccer game and halfway
through the game my friend passed the ball to me.
I took the ball up past half, he kicked it and he
missed the net. The other team had a throw-in.
We got the ball back and we took it off and we
passed it back to a point, to the centre and he
kicked it and scored. The ather team took the
ball. We had a k.ickaff. They came up and they
scored on us.
iii) And the other team had the ball fo!" the fir .. t up
and they kick it up and they run up after. And
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one of our players kick it down the field and then
down to o'\e of the forwards. And our forwards put
it to the middle where another forward picks it up
and he runs dO'o/n. But he's stopped by the defence
which puts it back up again where one of the
players get it again. But he loses it and another
player gets it on the other team and he runs up.
He takes a shot on the goal keeper, but the keeper
saves it. And then keeper takes it and it hits
somebody on the other team but it goes offside.
So its our play and one of our poople takes it
again and it goes down the side yard ""here another
person is waiting. And he runs in and he kicks it
\tiide, its is goal kick. And the keeper Iticks it
out again. And one of our players gets it again
and he goes down by the wing' and he puts it in the
centre. And one of the other people heads the
ball and it goes in the net.
6) Goal-based stories:
i) About a week ago I had a house league game which
is in the minor Soccer Association and my team ....as
taking on the best team in the league, the
Tommies. And once the game started we have a guy
on our team called B. And he usually goes
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offside about 7 times a game. And at the start of
the game it happened and we managed to score in
the first 5 minutes. And then we played the game
fairly aggressively. And then our defense was
playing well and our forwards were having a lot of
shots but they wouldn't go in. By half we were
still one up. And while then B. had about 4
offside calls and the team was getting a bit mad
at him. After half we still passed up the line.
We were playing our plays up the line. We were
trying to cross it over and score but every time
we crossed it over, B. was offside. So our coach
was getting a bit mad too. So we took him off and
talked to him for a bit and then our play was
getting a bit better. But in the last about 5
minutes they scored a goal on us and B. came
back on. And the call got crossed over and he
scared one and he wasn't offside then so it was 2
to 1 then. Then we played mainly defense for the
last 5 minutes and they had a few chances. And in
the last 1 minute they got a penalty shot because
one of our teammates P. hands the ball inside
the penalty area. And then one of their best
players who was on the B Allstar team, J., who
missed, he put it right off the crossbar. So
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eventually 'ile won the game 2 to 1.
ii) Once upon a time, a long time ago, there was this
kid and it was his first time playing soccer. He
was playing two of his other friends, D. and M.
And there was this other ref who didn' t know how
to play. So they were out playing with this brand
new rield, and he kicked the baIlout of bounds.
He didn't Know what it would mean since it was his
first time playing. The ref didn't know what it
means because he was just beginning. So they
didn't know there was going to be a throw-in.
Then there was this kid who came along, J. and he
knows about soccer. He told them what a throw-in
was and he got the other kid to play and then he
was the ref. So, they scored twice, but one goal
wasn't counted because they were inside the
crease. They didn't know what that means so we
had to take time out and 1 told them about how to
play soccer and af'·er 1 did that they played. And
then they didn't need any refs so I just went onto
another soccer field and played soccer. The end.
iii) It was like already half way through the sedson.
My best friend .J. and S. one of my team
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members, and all them had a lot of goals this
season and I didn't have one. I was like feeling
sad because I didn't have a goal or anything.
This whole game it was 3/4 of the way through, it
was 1 to 1 and it was about J on 2, like where
they had 3 players and we had 2. And I got out a
bit far and I took a shot. There was this big
guy there and like it hit off his stomach and
bounced back to me. And then I shot it and I got
it in the corner and it was my first goal of the
season. And all my friends lifted me up by the
arms and they were all cheering that and I got the
winning goal of the game. I was really happy then
because I got my first goal of the season.
7) Goal-based stories with multiple episodes:
i) Well, this is my first year in soccer in the world
cup league. And well the guy next to me, standing
next to me is Mara Donna. Anyway I/lJl quite happy
that I made it to the world cup game. This is the
last game and hopefully we will be able to win.
The game is started now, I got the ball and --- up
the field, passed it Mara Donna, I passed it to
Mara Donna, he's gone up the field. I go up to
the corner of the net and be careful not to go
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offside. Mara Donna passes, he kicks it into the
top right hand corner of the net. The crowd goes
cracked. R. game him the rooky, he scored his
first goal, his first goal of the season.
Germany, West Germany i:; kinda mad, they were
two seconds, two minutes into the game and they
got a goal scored against them. Well, Argentina
might just pull this one off. They are coming up,
they are trying to turn it around. You know what
happened last year, West Germany won. So,
Argentina is trying to win it back this year.
Oh God, the whistle blOWS, the first half is
ended already. We're into the second half. The
second half has started. So, I'm still playing,
I'm still playing on the right hand side, the
right striker. So, I'm going up the field again.
I pass it across to the left, it goes, they kick
it to l1ara Donna, Mara Donna shoots. Oh, it
rebounds out. I get it, I kick it across to Mara
Donna, Mara Donna shoots again. He score~ in the
bottom right, bottom left hand corner. So the
second half ends, it is 2 to 1, it is 2 to 1 tor
Argen"ina. Argentina wins the world cup. It's
over, it's allover tolks.
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ii) The Soccer Scandal, by A. C. As from my previous
story Grandfather time, ....hich was blown up from
all the clock explosion, was found by his brot.her
who lived in South Africa and heard about the news
and came to fix them up. They fixed him up and
they as grandfather time wlilnt to collect more
clocks to steal time. So they had this great idea
as soccer was in at the summertime. So they
decided to hide the clocks in the soccer balls.
So, as the alarms were on the clocks, grandfather
time snook into all the schools and stole all the
clocks on the walls and put them in the soccer
balls. As we found out the clocks were
disappearing, we decided to have a quick soccer
game to find Qut what was happening and we noticed
that the ball wasn't as light as it was, so we
just forgot about that and had our game.
After we decided to take our minds off of it,
we decided to go to Gt> 'many. We went to Germany
and sawall the players. And we sawall the
balls. And there was a demonstration. Buddy,
somebody was giving a demonstration on kicking and
as he took his kick he just rattled the post and
ball just cracked in two and a small wristwatch
came out. As we finally cracked the crime, we
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said, we thought what happened to Grandfather
time, and then we found out that Grandfather time
had been stealing the clocks.
We went back and we found Grandfather time
who was just, we saw Grandfather time and he was
really peed off as so we blew him up last time but
he got over that. So we asked him for a soccer
game and he was a little reluctant. The kic}r;.-off,
it was the kick-off and again as my friend from
Germany was with us, I took the ball right w.l.ng,
and I centred it on the trail. I took the back
pass, Grandfather time was. n and took the shot
and shattered his glass and caught right on the
top of his ---, and as the ball went up in the air
we ripped it open and found the clock. As the
police were phoned up earlier were there to arrest
Grandfather time and this time he was stay behind
bars for a long time. Thank you.
APPENDIX c: Tennis Pretest
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1. The purpose of the game of tennis is to:
a) always win your serve
b) collect all the tennis balls hit to you
c) winning enough sets to ...·in the match
d) play games until each set is over
How many games does (l. player (usually) win in order
to win the set?
.J 7 bJ 8 cJ 6 dJ 3
J. How long is the rest per lad after the third (if
men) or second set (if women) in a match?
a) 10 minutes b) 5 minutes
c) there ic no rest period d) 7 minutes
II. Nho is the first server in the next set when the
previous set ended with a tie-breaker?
a) player who did not serve first in the tie-
breaker game
b) player who won the last game before the tie-
breaker
c} player who wins the coin toss
d) player who served first in the tie·breaker game
5. I';hat does it mean to say a player "hit the ball
with top spin"?
a) the player spins around as he/she is making the
shot
b} hitting the ball so it rotates forwards
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c) hitting the ball so it goes out of bounds
d) hitting the ball so it rotates backwards
6. \'1hen a player "punches the racquet", this means?
a) thr")wing the racquet down because playar missed
a shot
b) stroke made when a player volleys the ball
cJ stroke made when player smashes the ball
d) player moves hands up on the grip
7. \.,hat is the difference in the serving position in
singles and doubles play?
a) there is no differences
b) in doubles, the server is further back from the
baseline
cJ in doubles, the server is closer to the doubles
alley
d) both band c
8. How is it decided who serves first in the match?
a) coin toss
cJ racquet; spin
b) player on the court first
d) either a or c
9. What is "ball sense"?
a l knowing what a tennis ball is
b) a good idea of what a ball may do
c) ability to hit the ball well
d) alert and ready to receive a serve
10. Some tennis players and called amateurs. This
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means?
a) they play tennis for fun
b) they play down the line
c) they are paid to play tennis
d) they play with their left hand
11. In playing a groundstroke, a players' weight
should be transferred from?
a) front to back
c) legs to arms
b) no weight transfer
d) back to front
12. What is the total number of games played in a set
which ends with a tie-breaker?
a) 12
c) 14
13. Where is the baseline?
b) 13
d) 6
a) back r;,f the court
b) back line of the serving box
c} side of the court
d} there is no baseline in tennis
14. Which grip is recommended for the forehand?
a) Continental
c) western
b) two-handed
d) Eastern
15. If a player "hits an overhead", he/she has?
a) hit the ball while it is over their head
b) made a mistake
c) put the baIlout of bounds
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d) lobbed the ball over the other players' head
16. What is the duty of the linesman?
a) makes sure the court has lines
b) call balls aut
c) enforces the rules of the game
dl coaches the players during play
17. Which of the following is NOT one 0'': the basic
strokes?
a) forehand
c) crosscourt
b) volley
d) serve
18. How would you describe the "ready position"?
a) player is on court ready to receive the ball
b) player is on the sidelines, ready to take the
next court
c) player has begun to prepare the stroke
dl there is no such thing
19. When can a match be won by cleraul t'!
a) when a player misses a shot
b} when a player doesn't win any games in the
first set
c) when a player is late for a game
dl when a player serves from the wrong side of the
court
20. What type of backhand creates the most power, most
of the time?
a) one-handed
c) two-handed
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b) Continental
d) depends on the type of racquet
21. Which of the following is NOT basic to making a
stroke?
al watching the ball
b) using a correct motion of the J.-acquet
c) standing in correct pl<lce on the court
d) using correct footwork
22. Which is MOST important to a beginner?
a) power
c) depth
b) accuracy
d) steadiness
23. When R,ust players stay on the same side of the
court for receiving until a set is over?
al in singles games
c) in doubles games
b) never
d) both a and c
24. After what games score do players change sides?
al odd games (1,3,5)
b) even games (2,'1,6)
c) after every game
d) players do not change sides
25. There is a lot of wrist associated with which
stroke?
al kicking serve
cJ backhand volley
26. A cross-court refers to?
b) flat serve
d) forehand volley
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a) serving to the service box on the other side of
the net
b) proper follow-through across the body
c) a strategy used in doubles play
dl nitt-ing the ball from the right side of the
court to the left side of the other coo.:rt
27. If you catch a ball hit by your opponent before it
bounces, ('ven if it is obviously going out, what
happens?
a) you win the point anyway as it was obviously
going out
b) nothing happens
c) the point is re-scrved
dl you lose the point
26. Where.-1o the players serve from?
a) behind the baseline
b) behind the serving box
c} just inside the baseline
d) in no man's land
29. Which term does NOT apply to tennis?
a) top-spin
c) cross-over spin
b) under-spin
dl back-spin
30. The Continental grip COULD be used for which
!';trokes?
a) serve b) forehand
c) volley d) a and c
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I1hc has the FINAL sayan a ball called out?
a) umpire
b) linesman
c) player closest to the ball
d) player who hit the ball
32. For a ball that touches the line?
a) it is called in
b) it is replayed, if it occurs on a serve
c) it is called out
d) it doeso't count
It is important to start the backswing early for
wh lch type of S '-rake?
a) ground stroke
cJ "'.at serve
b) backhand volley
d) slice serve
34. During a doubles game, can a player leave the
court while his/her partner Keeps the ball in
play?
a) only if they are Winning
b)
cJ yes
d) only if player is hurt
35. Which of the following refers to "no man's land"?
a) it is the area bet....een the baseline of the
court and the fence
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b) it is the area where a player is not standing
c) it is the area between the singles and doubles
court line
d) ! t is the area between the baseline and the
service line
APPENDIX 0: Stimulus Materials for Experiment II
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SOCCER
Poorly structured story
One day 1 was going aga inst the Robins. They are
team, I'm on the Sparrows. I have iJ gI"een t-shi,:t
and they have c. brown and white t-shirt. My last kick
went right across the field and I almost scored a goal.
Our first game against the Bluebirds I did some blocks.
I did the lag block, knee block, stomach block, and the
head block. I went in when wp were against the Ducks.
We \....on 9 to nothing, A.nd in another game against the
Seagulls we won 2 to 1. It started to rain. Someone
tried to kick the ball and he fell on his back. He was
covered in mud. He scored J goals and the other team
scored 6. And when I was in goal they shot 11 goals at
me. And the defense was hardly doing anything. And
that was it 2 to 11. When I made my first goal it
bounced off my leg. When I got home my ear was
bleeding from a fly bite, and my nose hurt.
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SOCCER
Well Structured Sto':y
Last week my team the Sparrows wer~ taking on the
best team in the league, the Robins. Davie on our team
usually goes offside about 7 times a game. lit the
start of the game it happened, but we still scored in
the first 5 minutes. Our defense were playing well and
our forwards were having a lot of shots but they
wouldn't go in. By half time Davie had about 4 offside
calls. After half, every time we crossed it over to
try to score, Davie was offside. Our coach took him
off the field. In the last 5 minutes they scored a
goal on us. Davie came back on, scored and he wasn't
offside then, so it was 2 to 1. 1'le. played defense for
the last 5 minutes and they had a few chances. In the
last 1 minute they got a penalty shot because one of
our teammates hands the ball inside the penalty area.
And then one of their best players missed the penalty
shot. so we won the game 2 to 1. Then we had a
celebration because we beat the best team in the
league.




